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The business environment is more uncertain, dynamic and complex, 
organizations are more diverse and harder to manage, and owners demand greater and 
greater returns. From the perspective of CEOs, these factors, in tandem with the level of 
success they expect from themselves, have led the position of CEO to become 
increasingly demanding. This has led to over a thousand CEOs leaving their jobs in 
both 2008 and 2009. Job demands at the employee level have been a construct of 
interest, with demands positively related to mental strain, job dissatisfaction and 
burnout. However, demands also have been seen to benefit performance somewhat with 
an inverse-U shaped relationship between job demands and performance. While job 
demands at the employee level have been well researched, very little has been done at 
the executive level. The effect of job demands on top executives should be of great 
interest, given the high impact these executives’ behavior has on the performance of a 
firm. 
In this dissertation, I examine the effects of executive job demands first by 
operationalizing the construct using observable proxies for the previously proposed 
components of task challenges (created by environmental complexity as well as 
organizational characteristics such as diversification, slack, and support from the top 
management team), performance challenges (created by expectations for performance 
from owners and measured by the monitoring imposed on managers from the owners) 
and executive aspirations (created by a CEO’s own expected level of performance). 
Using this operationalization, I examine how high job demands on a CEO affect their 




rational decision making of a manager such that they will limit their search for 
alternatives and be more likely to make decisions that mimic the strategic behavior of 
other similar firms. I find some support for this hypothesis. This limited rationality in 
decision making is also expected to cause a manager to lean more upon his or her prior 
experiences, strengthening previously demonstrated relationships between demographic 
characteristics of managers (upper echelon proxies for top manager cognitions) and 
strategic outcomes. However, I find no support for this hypothesis. As a final impact on 
decision making, high job demands are expected to cause a manager to vacillate in their 
strategic choices, leading a firm to exhibit frequent changes in strategy or have high 
strategic dynamism. There is some support for this hypothesis. 
This dissertation also considers the effect of executive job demands on firm 
performance, specifically that job demands will have an inverse-U shaped relationship 
with firm performance (ROA, ROE, ROI & Tobin’s Q). This hypothesis is not 
supported, however, there is some support that high demands are related to lower 
financial performance. Under high job demands, firm performance may also tend 
vacillate from year to year (performance variability), and there is some support for this 
hypothesis. Finally, while I examine main effects on the financial performance 
outcomes, I also consider that the strategic processes of conformity and dynamism 
affect these relationships. However, I do not find support for a mediating role of 




Chapter 1  
Introduction 
Overview 
“I went to (Ford's) board and told them I had too much to do. In this 
environment, with a relatively young management team facing tough times, I 
felt that we could benefit from leadership of someone who had been through 
tough  times successfully." 
-William C. Ford, Jr. (CNNMoney.com, 2006) 
 CEOs have been staying in their jobs for shorter and shorter periods in recent 
years, with studies1 showing an average length of tenure of six years (Kaplan & 
Minton, 2006). Further, 1,482 CEOs left their positions in 2008 and 1,227 left in 2009 
(up from 663 in 2004) with the majority citing the ambiguous “resignation” as to the 
reason why (Hsu, 2009).   This turnover is not without consequences, with any change 
in firm leadership frequently leading to organizational change with mixed acceptance, 
increased rates of failure and mixed to negative impacts on the market performance of 
firms (Kenser & Sebora, 1994). 
 One possible explanation for such phenomena may be that the demands on top 
executives are too high and growing. When William Ford Jr. stepped down from the 
CEO and president position, he was doing the jobs of the CEO, president and 
chairperson. Further, the firm did not have a COO, and those responsibilities had 
become part of the office of the president. Externally, there was a perception that “the 
old game plan no longer (worked) in an auto industry facing nimble rivals in an 
                                                 
1 Kaplan and Minton’s study looked at CEOs from 1992-2005. Over the full sample, the average tenure 




increasingly globalized market” (Freeman & Merle, 2006). The company was cutting 
production plans, shutting plants for extended periods of time, and divesting 
automobile brands (CNNMoney.com, 2006). Further, consumer preferences were seen 
as changing, and the company had lost $1.4 billion in the first half of the year 
(Freeman & Merle, 2006). Ford seemed to be facing strong environmental challenges, 
organizational limitations and performance challenges when he decided to step down. 
From a theoretical standpoint, it may be that Ford was affected by his position being a 
highly demanding one, leading him to withdraw (by reducing his role to only that of 
chairperson). 
This dissertation is an inquiry into how such high demands may affect the 
behavior of top executives. The overarching research question considered is how 
executive job demands affect the strategic choices of the CEO and the subsequent firm 
outcomes. This question and some of the relationships to be examined come out of 
Hambrick, Finkelstein and Mooney’s (2005a) theoretical paper that first considered the 
impact of executive job demands. 
 With William Ford’s withdrawal in mind, it may be useful to consider how job 
demands affect a top manager. At any level, job demands can be seen as “physical, 
social, or organizational aspects of the job that require sustained physical or mental 
effort” (Demerouti, Bakker, Nachreiner, & Schaufeli, 2001: 501). Such demands or 
stressors  can lead to withdrawal from the organization  (Drake & Yadama, 1996; 
Geurts, Schaufeli & De Jonge, 1998; Jex, 1998; Koeske & Koeske, 1993; Podsakoff, 
LePine & LePine, 2007) reduction of in role behaviors (Cropanzano, Rupp, & Byrne, 




also lead to exhaustion (Demerouti et al., 2001) and other physical health problems 
(Theorell & Karasek, 1996), negative emotions and cognitions  (Jex, 1998) mental 
strain, and job dissatisfaction (Karasek, 1979). However, not all effects are negative. It 
is suggested that too easy or hard a job can lower satisfaction or performance, but 
moderate job demands can increase the satisfaction and performance (Janssen, 2001). 
This would seem to be supported by achievement motivation theory, suggesting that 
high achievers actually look for a moderate challenge (McClelland, 1962; 1976).  
Further, if employees see their job stressors as creating opportunity for development 
and achievement, they may actually become more satisfied, committed and perform 
better (Cavanaugh, Boswell, Roehling & Boudreau, 2000; LePine, Podsakoff, LePine, 
2005; Podsakoff et al., 2007) 
 The outcomes from excessive job demands at any level of the organization can 
be detrimental to the smooth functioning of said organization. However, the effects of 
executive job demands may have a greater impact due to the relative importance of the 
top executives, specifically CEOs, on organizational outcomes (Hambrick 2007; 
Hambrick et al., 2005a). Given the assumption that the strategic choices of individuals 
does have an effect on firm outcomes, organizational actors, especially at the upper 
echelons of the firm, can affect the performance of an organization (Child, 1972). 
These individuals’ strategic choices are expected to reflect the values and cognitions of 
top managers (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). These executives also have relatively great 
power within an organization. Given this, the cognitions of top managers are seen as 
important due to the sizable impact their decisions have on the firm (Carpenter, 




 Executive job demands are seen to come out of external environmental 
pressures, organizational structure, owner expectations for a given level of performance 
and the aspirations an executive places on themselves (Hambrick et al., 2005a) Such 
demands may impact the decision making processes of a top executive by limiting their 
cognitive capacity. Even without high demands, the information processing 
requirements already on a manager limit their ability to search for and evaluate all 
possible alternatives, forcing them to be boundedly rational in their decision making 
(Cyert & March, 1963). Further, the less procedural rationality used in making the 
decision (driven by the constraints on time used for a comprehensive search for 
information or for analysis of such information), the less likely the decisions will be 
effective (Dean & Sharfman, 1996). High job demands are expected to exacerbate this 
problem, putting further constraints on the time for search and processing (Hambrick et 
al., 2005a).  
 High job demands may create stress for top executives (Karasek, 1979). Stress 
has been shown to have two possible outcomes on decision making. First, stress may 
restrict information gathering and processing, leading a firm to behave rigidly and with 
a greater focus on its prior behavior (Staw, Sandelands & Dutton, 1981). Conversely, 
executives under high stress may engage in high levels of strategic initiatives and then 
vacillate between high levels of activity and paralysis (Hambrick & D’Aveni, 1988; 
Staw et al., 1981). High stress may also do more to activate the top managers (Gardner, 
1986; Gardner & Cummings, 1988; Janssen, 2001), leading to greater interaction. How 
such stressors are perceived may be important to such results (Cavanaugh et al. 2000; 




Importance of the Research 
Theoretical contributions. The theoretical basis for this dissertation was laid out 
in Hambrick, Finkelstein and Mooney’s (2005a) paper on executive job demands. As 
such, this dissertation is focusing primarily upon their arguments. However, this 
dissertation does make a theoretical contribution by consideration of upper echelons 
theory through the Brunswik (1956) lens model. Upper echelons provides important 
insight as to how managers make decisions, namely that they perceive information 
through their values and cognitions. However, it does not address the question fully of 
why these processes affect managerial decision (Bacharach, 1989). The lens model 
assumes that individuals do not directly perceive things in the external environment but 
rather perceive multiple fallible indicators of a given object or event. Not all possible 
indicators are perceived by an individual, but the indicators that are perceived are 
chosen based upon an individual’s values and cognitions (using the upper echelons 
nomenclature - Hambrick & Mason, 1984). Given the tremendous impact a top 
manager’s decisions can have on the overall performance of the firm, greater 
understanding of the drivers of such decisions, specifically how an individual’s lens 
selects indicators, can contribute meaningfully to the literature. Given that job demands 
on executives seem to be increasing with a more uncertain, dynamic and complex 
business environment, more diverse and difficult to manage organizations and 
increasing demands from ownership for greater and greater returns, it seems that study 
of the effects of such demands would be of increasing theoretical importance. 
Therefore, this study examines how such demands shrink the number of indicators 




Empirical Contributions. As stated, Hambrick and colleagues’ prior work 
drives much of the theoretical arguments; thus the overall empirical contribution is to 
test this prior work. Specifically the first empirical contribution of this dissertation is to 
examine a number of direct effects of executive job demands on the decision making 
processes of top executives (and the subsequent strategic processes and performance 
outcomes of such decisions). This dissertation begins by testing whether the constraints 
on information gathering and processing created by job demands; constraints which 
shrink the number if indicators considered and tighten the lens; will lead a manager to 
implement policies that mimic the strategic behavior of other, exemplar firms 
regardless of the appropriateness of such action (Hambrick et al., 2005a; Haveman, 
1993). Second, the dissertation tests the question of if the stress created by executive 
job demands will distort the lens through which a manager perceives the environment, 
leading indicators to be perceived as threats. Such perceptions of the indicators as 
threats may cause an executive to be more likely to vacillate between engaging in many 
strategic actions in one year, and then do nothing the next (Hambrick & D’Aveni, 
1988; Hambrick et al., 2005a; Staw et al., 1981). Finally, job demands are expected to 
have an impact on the firm’s “bottom line,” so the direct effects of executive job 
demands on a firm’s financial performance and whether or not such performance is 
stable, or varies wildly from year to year are examined. 
 For a second contribution, this dissertation considers the potential moderating 
effects of executive job demands. This moderating effect is another possible 
consequence of the restriction of information gathering and processing. Given that an 




making, once again the executives lens is expected to tighten, leading an executive to 
filter indicators even more through his or her values and cognitive bases and lean more 
on his or her past experiences (Hambrick et al., 2005a). Given this greater  reliance on 
values and cognitive bases and the greater emphasis on prior experience, job demands 
are expected to moderate traditional upper echelons relationships (i.e. the relationship 
between an executive’s demographic characteristics and their strategic behaviors -
Hambrick, 2007). This dissertation examines such a relationship by testing previously 
suggested relationships between executive tenure and the strategic processes in the 
model plus examining how executive job demands moderate this relationship. This is 
expected to expand both the understanding of job demands’ effects on the cognitions of 
a manager, as well as offering greater understanding of what elements may impact the 
demographics-to-strategy upper echelons model. 
 While the direct and moderating effects of executive job demands are expected 
to affect strategic processes and firm outcomes significantly, it may be that the 
relationships are complex and that they may feed into one another. Again, with the 
assumption that the choice of a manager can affect the outcomes of a firm (Child, 
1972), it is likely that the strategic processes chosen have an impact on the 
performance of a firm. This dissertation asserts that there will be a significant 
relationship between executive job demands and the strategic processes of the firm. 
Therefore, the third empirical contribution this dissertation will make is to test an 
alternate explanation of the proposed relationships between executive job demands, 




relationships. Specifically, I test to see if strategic processes will fully mediate the 
relationship between executive job demands and firm performance. 
Measurement contributions. Despite executive job demands being seen as a 
potentially important determinant of top executive behavior (and by their actions, firm 
behavior), there has not yet been a study testing the effect of executive job demands 
(Hambrick, 2007). Ng, Ang and Chan (2008) did perform a study showing the 
moderating role of job demands on the relationship between leader effectiveness 
(mediated by leader self-efficacy) and neuroticism, extraversion and conscientiousness. 
However, this relationship was examined by looking at the leader effectiveness of 
military recruits using a five item scale examining workload, task difficulty and 
problem solving demands. While there is a leadership component of top executive 
behavior, this study is not particularly generalizable to a strategic context in trying to 
examine how the cognitions of a top manager affect the actions and performance of a 
firm.  
Further, while this measure was appropriate for their context, the survey seems 
inappropriate for further research on executives for two reasons. Firstly, the questions 
may not be appropriate for the demands placed on a top executive, given that the 
questions do not reflect that many of the top executive’s decisions are non routine and 
create streams of sub-decisions (Hickson, Butler, Gray, Mallory & Wilson, 1985; 
Mintzberg, Raisinghani & Theoret, 1976). These questions are also inappropriate 
because they ignore one proposed driver of demands, the executive’s own aspirations. 
Secondly, because this measure requires surveying executives, it may limit the ability 




focuses on the use of observable characteristics as proxies of manager cognitions, at 
least in part, due to the difficult in gaining access to such top managers (Carpenter et 
al., 2004; Hambrick & Mason, 1984).  
 The major methodological contribution of this dissertation is the creation of a 
measure of executive job demands based upon observable characteristics. This measure 
draws from the theoretical construct proposed by Hambrick et al.,  (2005a) who 
suggested that executive job demands are made up of task challenges (demands created 
by environmental pressures and characteristics of the organization), performance 
challenges (demands for financial performance from a firm’s owners) and the 
individual aspirations of the manager (an internal pressure to perform). These three 
elements of job demands are measured using measures of organizational characteristics 
(e.g. productivity, diversification, slack); agency measures to capture the performance 
challenges placed on a manager, and biographical and compensation based data as 
observable proxies of the aspirations of a manager. 
Managerial contributions. The current statistics on turnover at the CEO level raise an 
interesting question: Is the job of CEO too hard? Are the demands placed on the CEO 
so high that a single individual cannot handle those demands? William Ford’s example 
of being an executive wearing too many hats in a highly demanding environment may 
suggest that the demands on the job of CEO have surpassed the capacity of any one 
individual to do it. This study will attempt to establish the effects of such high demands 
on the manager. These effects may show that by asking so much out of a CEO, their 
effectiveness in terms of their decisions and the performance of the firm will be 




the CEO level. It may also suggest that a larger executive team will mitigate the effects 
of such high demands. 
Organization of the Dissertation 
 This dissertation will continue as follows. In chapter two, I review the relevant 
elements of the job demands and upper echelons literatures. From this background, I 
outline how these literatures come together for the executive job demands construct. 
With this construct established, I develop hypotheses that examine the direct, 
moderated and mediated effects between executive job demands, strategic processes 
and firm performance. Chapter three outlines how the executive job demands construct 
is measured and the other previously established measures that are used to test the 
hypotheses. This dissertation uses a sample of 200 firms from multiple industries to 
test the hypotheses. OLS regression and structural equations modeling (SEM) is used 
to test the various hypotheses. Chapter four provides the results of this study, and 






Chapter 2  
Literature Review and Hypotheses 
 This dissertation examines the effects executive job demands have on strategic 
processes and financial performance. This chapter discusses the theoretical background 
behind this research question, beginning with a review of the upper echelons 
perspective with emphasis on integrating the Brunswik lens model (1956). Next, I 
review three models of job demands with an emphasis on outcomes of job demands. 
The executive job demands model, explicated by Hambrick et al.,  (2005a) and 
informed by my previous discussion on upper echelons and job demands is described. 
Finally, hypotheses on possible direct, mediated and moderated relationships with 
strategic processes and financial performance are proposed. 
The Upper Echelons Perspective 
 The upper echelons perspective, as first proposed by Hambrick and Mason 
(1984), focuses on the top executives for explanations of a firm’s behavior. Rather than 
assuming that a firm’s actions and outcomes are determined entirely by their industry 
group (Porter, 1980) or by shifts in the external environment (Hannan & Freeman, 
1977), the upper echelons perspective assumes that a manager’s choice matters (Child, 
1972) and therefore shapes the behavior and outcomes of the firm. With this focus on 
strategic choice, upper echelons considers that “executives act on the basis of their 
personalized interpretations of the strategic situations they face and …these 
personalized construals are a function of the executives’ experiences, values and 
personalities” (Hambrick, 2007: 334). The focus is placed on the top executives in a 




the greatest impact on the organization’s mission and goals (Cyert & March, 1963). 
The top executives represent the primary interface between the firm and its external 
environment and have a relatively high degree of power in the organization, leading to 
said top executives’ behavior having a strong impact on that organization’s actions and 
outcomes (Carpenter et al., 2004). 
 Upper echelons takes a behavioral theory perspective in that it views the 
decisions of top managers as made in a boundedly rational way (Hambrick, 2007; 
Hambrick & Mason, 1984). Under such assumptions of bounded rationality, the 
amount of information a manager has access to is overwhelming (Mintzberg, 1973) and 
a manager cannot optimize his or her decisions because of the information processing 
requirements. Rather, the manager chooses a satisfactory course of action (Simon, 
1947; March & Simon, 1958). In selecting alternatives, how a manager perceives 
information in the environment and how they make choices is based upon their 
cognitive bases and their values (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). 
 Managers alter their perception of the environment and the organization in three 
important ways (Hambrick & Snow, 1977). First, managers selectively choose what 
elements of the environment and organization on which to focus their attention. This 
attention can be dependent on the context or situation the manager is in and how the 
organization is set up (Ocasio, 1997). Next, that manager further limits their perception 
by selectively perceiving information within those elements to which he or she is 
paying attention. Finally, the information is filtered through the manager’s cognitive 




The original upper echelons perspective put the emphasis on the entire top 
management team (TMT), rather than a single executive (usually the CEO) (Hambrick 
& Mason, 1984). The shifted emphasis to the group level was undertaken with the 
understanding that leadership of an organization is shared with the team, and such a 
focus would lead to better explanations of the organization’s outcomes (Hambrick, 
2007). This dissertation does not consider the entire TMT, but rather does focus solely 
on the CEO2. There is acknowledgement that, despite the explanatory power found 
with a focus on the TMT, there are still some questions best considered at the 
individual level of analysis (Carpenter et al., 2004) and thus upper echelons research is 
not restricted exclusively to the group level. While some characteristics of executive 
job demands are applicable to the entire team and the theory suggests that as the 
demands on the CEO rise the demands on the rest of the team will also rise (Hambrick 
et al., 2005a), some of the elements of demands affect the CEO greater than the 
elements would affect another manager in the firm. 
 Methodologically, the upper echelons perspective created a focus on observable 
proxies for cognitions and values of a top manager (Hambrick & Mason, 1984).   Use 
of such data is important because of the great difficulty in getting data from top 
managers of major firms. Such observable characteristics can be things like tenure, 
functional background, age (Hambrick & Mason, 1984), but can also be deeper 
assessments of specific characteristics, such as international experience (Carpenter & 
Fredrickson, 2001), content analyses of shareholder letters as assessments of 
                                                 
2 I did use the variables TMT heterogenity, TMT firm tenure and TMT team tenure in my analysis. 
However, those variables were used to reflect challenges presented to the CEO by working with a less 
experienced TMT with a narrower base of experience. The analysis is focused on demands at the CEO 




managerial attention (Abrahamson & Hambrick, 1997) and CEO pictures in the annual 
report as assessments of narcissism (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007).  These proxies are 
admittedly incomplete and imprecise (Hambrick 2007), but the lowered cost of 
gathering enough data for meaningful analysis offsets the loss of precision. In general, 
the examination of demographic characteristics as a proxy for cognitions and values 
has shown a meaningful impact on firm outcomes (see Finkelstein & Hambrick [1996] 
and Carpenter et al. [2004] for a review). 
Upper Echelons Theory and the Lens Model. 
Where upper echelons has shown a strong capacity to predict, it does not quite 
meet the test of strong theory in its ability to explain (Bacharach, 1989), specifically in 
its ability to explain why cognitions and values might affect strategic choice and 
subsequent outcomes. The upper echelons perspective describes the process 
sequentially: the environment is too complex to be perceived by a given decision 
maker, thus they screen the environment, selectively perceiving and interpreting 
information based upon their cognitive bases and values (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). 
What is not described is why these cognitions and values are used to filter and interpret 
information. To find explanations for this filtering mechanism, it may be useful to 
consider the decision making mechanisms assumed in upper echelons thinking through 
psychological theory. 
 The upper echelons perspective seems to agree with Brunswik’s (1956) lens 
model of perception. This model suggests that objects are not directly perceived by 
individuals, but instead perception depends on the attributes of the object, the context 




(Fiske & Taylor, 1991). The lens model assumes that there is a great degree of 
uncertainty in the world (Hammond, 1996). To cope with this uncertainty, an 
individual needs a perceptual lens through which they view the external environment 
(Wolf, 2005). Through this lens, individuals integrate multiple fallible indicators as a 
means of interpreting the world (Hammond, 2000), a means of seeing the world very 
much in synch with the upper echelons perspective. 
This concept of multiple fallible indicators suggests that we make inferences 
about the true state of a given object based upon a number of characteristics of that 
given object. None of those indicators completely describe the object nor can they be 
seen as perfectly dependable (Hammond, 2000). No combination of these indicators 
will completely eliminate the uncertainty around the true nature of the object. So innate 
is the tendency of human beings to use multiple fallible indicators, that they will 
construct indicators in their absence.  Each individual must independently weight the 
multiple indicators in their perception.  
As demonstrated in Figure 1, the validity of each indicator can vary. One 
indicator might give a very accurate impression of the object of interest while another 
might only describe the object in a passing way. As a result, more accurate judgments 
about the object of interest can be made provided that the individual gives greater 
weight to the more valid indicators. Time may also be an important component of 
analyzing such indicators, in as much as an individual can better analyze the multiple 


















The lens model: the pictorial representation of the presence of (1) multiple fallible 
indicators (center), (2) their differential degrees of validity (thickness of lines indicate 
degree of validity), (3) their interrelationships (dashed lines), (4) degree of utilization 
(or weight by judge), and accuracy of judgment. 
 
(Hammond, 1996: 168) 
 
  
How these judgments are made hinges on an organizing principle, “the 
cognitive mechanism by which the information from multiple fallible indicators is 
organized into a judgment” (Hammond, 1996: 171). The principle may be to treat all  
indicators equally, to average the indicators or to give different weight to each 
indicator. Using the upper echelons nomenclature, it is the cognitive bases and values 
of a top executive that affects which multiple fallible indicators he or she most relies 




In Hambrick and Mason’s (1984) original conceptualization, cognitive bases 
and values are the filter through which information passes. This leads to what 
information is perceived and how it is interpreted as a top executive makes a strategic 
decision. Using the lens model as an explanation for this process, the cognitions and 
values of the top executive serve to tighten or expand the lens through which they 
perceive either the external environment or organizational cues. With an expanded 
lens, more indicators may be perceived and more sophisticated organizing principles 
may be used (leading to greater accuracy in judgments). With a tightened lens, the 
cognitions and values of a top executive serve to limit the number of indicators 
perceived and diminish the effectiveness of the organizing principle. 
 With the upper echelons perspective established and its connection to the lens 
model discussed, I will now discuss theory underlying the job demands construct. I will 
then tie the two together by discussing the executive job demands construct and then 
propose the hypotheses this dissertation will test. 
Job Demands 
 As stated before, job demands can be seen as “physical, social, or 
organizational aspects of the job that require sustained physical or mental effort” 
(Demerouti et al., 2001: 501). The mental effort can be either cognitively based or 
emotionally based (Bakker & Demerouti, 2007). Such demands are not automatically 
negative, but they become job stressors in situations when high effort is required and 
the employee is not given adequate time to recover (Meijman & Mulder, 1998). When 
they become stressors, they may lead to strains, including anxiety, exhaustion, 




demands interact with other elements of the job to create physical and mental strain in 
the individual. Such strain can affect said individuals’ physical and psychological well 
being as well as the individual’s performance. The first of these models is the demand-
control-model (DCM), which is influenced by the demands on an individual and the 
amount of control an employee feels he or she has over the performance of their job 
(Karasek, 1979). This model emphasizes demands created by work overload, time 
pressure or conflicting demands created by performance of their jobs. There is an 
appreciation within the DCM model that task related demands are the major source of 
job pressures (Buck, 1972). Job control focuses on the ability of the employee to 
control their activities and skill usage (Karasek & Theorell, 1990) and may also be seen 
as the autonomy an employee has (Bakker & Demerouti, 2007). This model focuses on 
the interaction between these two constructs with the greatest mental and physical 
strain put on the employee when a job has high demands and little control. There has 
been strong support for the hypothesis of demands leading to strain (Karasek, 1979; 
Schnall, Landsbergis, & Baker, 1994), but less conclusive support for the interaction 
effect between control and demands on strain (Bakker & Demerouti, 2007; De Jonge & 
Kompier, 1997; Van der Doef & Maes, 1999) or burnout (Halbesleben & Buckley, 
2004). 
 The second model, the effort-reward imbalance model (ERI), focuses more on 
the rewards associated with work (Siegrist, 1996). This model sees strain as the 
outcome of an imbalance between effort and rewards, where the greatest strain comes 
out of situations where an employee is putting forth great effort and receiving low 




(physical demands, time constraints, psychological effort) and intrinsic sources (the 
internal motivations of a worker). Alternate conceptions of the ERI model (Siegrist, 
1999; van Vegchel, de Jonge, Bosma & Schaufeli, 2005) have suggested that intrinsic 
sources might better be conceptualized as overcommitment, “a set of attitudes, 
behaviors and emotions reflecting excessive striving in combination with a strong 
desire of being approved and esteemed” (Bakker & Demerouti, 2007: 310). In this 
model, overcommitment could lead to job strain even without an imbalance between 
extrinsically driven efforts and rewards, but the greatest strain would be created when 
an imbalance between extrinsic job demands and rewards interacts with 
overcommitment (Siegrist, 2002). 
 Under conditions of imbalance, the equity theory predictions (Adams, 1963) of 
reduction of effort, maximization of rewards or withdrawal from the situation would be 
undertaken by the individual in the imbalance situation. However, in certain 
conditions; no alternative job opportunities, strategic choice for expected future returns, 
or the individual is prone to work related overcommitment; an individual may persist in 
these conditions of imbalance (Siegrist, 1996). If the individual persists, they are prone 
to physiological impairments (Siegrist, 1996), burnout (de Jonge, Bosma, Peter & 
Siegrist, 2000) and lowered job satisfaction (Calnan, Wainwright & Almond, 2000) 
(see van Vegchel et al. [2005] for a more exhaustive review). 
 While there has been empirical support for the DCM and ERI models (van der 
Doef & Maes, 1999; van Vegchel et. al, 2005), there is concern that the models do not 
completely consider the complexity of organizations and may focus on variables 




Demerouti, 2007). To address this concern, Demerouti et al.,  (2001) proposed the Job 
Demands-Resources (JD-R) model. This model presumes that each job has different 
elements that may create or mitigate stress and that those elements can be categorized 
as either job demands or job resources. Job demands are again focused on elements of 
the job leading to increased and sustained effort. Job resources are physical, 
psychological, social or organizational elements of a job that are “(a) functional in 
achieving work goals; (b) reduce job demands at the associated physiological and 
psychological costs; (c) stimulate personal growth and development” (Demerouti et al., 
2001: 501). With this definition, resources are important both for their ability to 
mitigate job demands as well as to help achieve positive personal and organizational 
outcomes. Looking to the previous models, the resources construct would include the 
control of the DCM and the rewards of the ERI. 
 Under the JD-R model, demands exhaust the mental  and physical resources of 
an employee, potentially leading to exhaustion and health problems (Bakker & 
Demerouti, 2007; Demerouti et al., 2001) and are seen as the most crucial predictor of 
job strain (Bakker, van Veldhoven & Xanthopoulou, 2010). Additionally, job resources 
are the most crucial driver of motivation, and can lead to high work engagement, low 
cynicism and good performance (Bakker & Demerouti, 2007). The model also assumes 
an interaction effect such that the highest levels of strain and the lowest levels of 
motivation would be found in a situation with high demands and low resources.  
 The stress literature may also have some interesting effects on my job demands 
conceptualization. In general stressors are “stimuli that induce the stress process” 




exhaustion and depression (Jex, 1998). From a job demands perspective, while a 
demand might become a stressor, an employee given time to recover from high 
demands will be better able to mitigate such stressors’ effects  (Meijman & Mulder, 
1998). When demands become stressors, they may lead to strains, including anxiety, 
exhaustion, depression and burnout (Jex, 1998). Just as the JD-R model suggests that 
there are elements of the job that make it harder or easier, the stress literature suggests 
that there are stressors that can engage or discourage. Challenge stressors  are aspects 
of a job that managers might see as obstacles to be overcome in order to succeed in 
tasks and grow personally and professionally. These include things such as number of 
projects to attend to, time pressures and responsibility (Cavanaugh et al., 2000). 
Cavanaugh and colleagues felt there were also hindrance stressors, demands which 
prevented personal growth and task success. These demands include such things as 
internal politics, indefinite job requirements and lack of job security. These differing 
types of stressors have different effects on the employees perceiving them with 
hindrance stressors increasing turnover and turnover intentions while decreasing job 
satisfaction and performance whereas challenge stressors had the opposite effect 
(Cavanaugh et al., 2000; LePine et al., 2005; Podsakoff et al., 2007). 
 Further, there may be a connection between types of stressors and motivation. 
LePine and colleagues (2005) suggested that challenge stressors may be related to high 
motivation because people believe there to be a relationship between the effort 
expended on the various tasks and positive outcomes from these tasks. However, 
hindrance stressors decrease motivation because people do not perceive there being 




little relationship between exerting effort and successful outcomes so will therefore 
have little motivation to exert effort to deal with these stressors. 
 While I have addressed some of outcomes found for each model, I would like to 
highlight certain outcomes of excessive job demands important to the present study of 
executive job demands. First is burnout. Employees experiencing burnout experience 
emotional exhaustion, depersonalization and reduced personal accomplishment 
(Halbesleben & Buckley, 2004; Maslach, 1982). With emotional exhaustion, 
employees’ emotional resources are depleted and they often feel they can give no more 
to their job. Depersonalization is a response to this exhaustion whereby employees 
detach from their job and begin feeling uncaring towards their job, performance and 
individuals associated with the job. Reduced personal accomplishment refers to an 
employee’s personal perception that he or she is not as capable as performing well at a 
job as they once could. From a JD-R perspective, high demands affect burnout by 
leading to emotional exhaustion while resources help motivate employees and prevent 
them from experiencing the depersonalization element of burnout (Demerouti et al., 
2001). Burnout can lead to negative consequences for the organization, including 
increased turnover/turnover intention (Drake & Yadama, 1996; Geurts et. al , 1998; 
Koeske & Koeske, 1993) and lowered job performance (Wright & Bonett, 1997; 
Wright & Crapanzano, 1998).  
 One possible reaction to high demands is utilizing a performance-protection 
strategy wherein an individual avoids serious disruption to performance in a task at 
greater cost to activities that are less relevant to task performance (Hockey, 1993). 




As an adjustment, an individual might make changes to their task strategies. 
Importantly, under highly demanding conditions, an individual might narrow the focus 
of their attention and be more selective in the information they pay attention to 
(Broadbent, 1971; Hockey, 1979). Further, if such demands cause an individual to be 
exhausted, they may make more risky choices and exhibit behaviors that require less 
effort (Holding, 1983). 
 Finally, while much of my discussion has focused on the negative impacts of 
job demands, there may be a relatively positive effect of demands. Under activation 
theory, (Gardner, 1986; Gardner & Cummings, 1988), a task that engages neural 
activity (activation level) above or below an individual’s usual level of activity has the 
effect of gradually decreasing both affect and performance of the task. The degree to 
which a given job is demanding is seen as increasing the worker’s activation level. As 
that activation level raises to the individual’s usual level, performance increases up to 
the point where the activation level surpasses the normal activation level, at which 
point performance decreases (Gardner & Cummings, 1988; Janssen, 2001). This 
relationship also follows achievement motivation theory, which would suggest that 
high achievers set moderate, yet challenging goals for themselves (McClelland, 1962, 
1976).   There may be other interactions with the motivation level of the employee. If 
they are given tasks which are challenging but are seen as achievable such that there is 
a perceived relationship between effort and outcome, performance will increase 
(LePine et al., 2005), but as the difficulty of the challenges themselves increase the 
outcomes may decrease (Ganster, 2005). Thus, there is an inverse-U shaped 




appearance of a inverse-U as performance increases due to activation, but decreases 
due to challenge difficulty). 
  
Executive Job Demands 
 Executive job demands, as described by Hambrick et al., (2005a), can simply 
be looked at as “job demands at the executive level” (Hambrick et al., 2005a: 473), but 
more formally as “the degree to which a given executive experiences his or her job as 
difficult or challenging” (473). Drawing from the upper echelons perspective, the focus 
is put on the demands on executives because of the heightened effect their decisions 
have on the firm (Carpenter et al., 2004). Hambrick et al. (2005a) proposed that the 
demands felt by top managers could be traced to objective constraints the job (task 
challenges), demands for a given level of profitability (performance challenges) and the 
personal motivation of the manager (executive aspirations). 
 Task challenges acknowledge that the demands on a given manager are higher 
or lower given the environmental or organizational constraints with which that 
manager must deal (Hambrick et al., 2005a). It is possible that the structure of the 
industry, the degree of competition and the demands of buyers and suppliers may make 
the job of executives in one industry more demanding than in another (Porter, 1980). If 
a given industry is diverse in terms of suppliers, buyers, products, markets and 
technical intricacy; is unstable in changes to both its market and technology; and if 
competition for resources is strong; it adds to the uncertainty in the industry and 
increases the demands for information processing (Dess & Beard, 1984; Sharfman & 




(Barney, 1991), creating different levels of demands given the structure of said firm. A 
manager of a firm with greater levels of slack will have a less demanding time adapting 
to challenges than one with lower levels of slack (Bourgeois, 1981; Sharfman, Wolf, 
Chase & Tansik, 1988). The support of an effective management team may make 
decision making easier than a CEO working with less support from his or her TMT 
(Hambrick & Mason, 1984). A firm may overdiversify, making it more demanding to 
control all the disparate businesses within the corporation (Grant, Jammine & Thomas, 
1988). The more challenging the external environment and the organizational structure, 
the more demanding the manager’s job will be. Alternately, in the JD-R view, the more 
demands and fewer resources a job has, the more strain it will cause. 
 Performance challenges come out of the external demands from the owners of 
the firm for a given level of performance (Hambrick et al., 2005a). While demand for 
greater and greater returns is likely universal, the demands are seen as rising as a result 
of the voice that the owners have. Under strong agency conditions, especially strong 
control conditions (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976), the demands 
from owners will likely be very salient to managers. If the board of directors has many 
outsiders (Fama, 1980) who hold equity interests in the firm (Morck, Scleifer & 
Vishny, 1988) and are not under the influence of the CEO (Westphal & Zajac, 1994), 
the board is seen as putting more pressure from ownership on the managers to perform. 
Further, large blockholders, such as institutional owners, may be more likely to closely 
monitor managerial behavior and influence their direction (Useem, 1993). Greater 




 Executive aspirations refer to the motivations of the top manager to achieve a 
given level of performance (Hambrick et al. 2005a). This internal motivation might be 
based upon their need for achievement, their “degree of striving to meet standards of 
excellence, to accomplish different tasks and to achieve success” (McClelland, 1962, 
1976; Miller & Droge, 1986: 541). Such achievers take responsibility for getting things 
done. Reward seeking behaviors may also affect the aspirations of an executive. With 
compensation closely tied to firm goals, the manager will strive to achieve those goals 
to obtain the reward (Fama & Jensen, 1983).  Looking to the ERI model (Siegrist, 
1996), a desire to achieve could lead an individual to overcommit and put too much of 
oneself into the task (Siegrist, 1999). Further, if managers are taking responsibility 
largely upon themselves for firm success and have the additional pressures to obtain 
their rewards, it is possible that in objectively demanding situations this added pressure 
from their need for achievement and reward would exacerbate the demands placed by 
environment, organizational structure and ownership. 
 Of primary interest to this study is the effect high job demands have on decision 
making. For effective decisions to be made, managers must engage in a sensemaking 
process (Weick, 1979). This process is made up of scanning (information gathering), 
interpretation and subsequent action based on the information and its interpretation 
(Daft & Weick, 1984; Thomas, Clark & Gioia, 1993).  Scanning involves looking to 
both the external environment and the internal functions of the organization to identify 
important information that may affect the future functioning of the firm. Oftentimes, 
managers are inundated with more information than is useful (Mintzberg, 1973) and 




Snow, 1977). These multiple fallible indicators of the business environment and the 
organization are viewed through the lens of the manager’s cognitive bases and values 
to limit the information they attend to (Brunswik, 1956; Hammond, 2000). 
Interpretation allows comprehension of the information gathered during the scanning 
process (Thomas et al., 1993) and involves fitting the information into some structure 
for understanding and action. By gathering relevant information for a given course of 
action and relying upon analysis of said information, the decision made is seen to be 
procedurally rational (Dean & Sharfman, 1993) 
 Demands brought on by dynamic and complex systems may overwhelm 
executives (Munyon, Summers, Buckley, Ranft & Ferris, 2010) negatively affecting 
the sensemaking process. Important information may be passed over, and top managers 
may subsequently make decisions in a less procedurally rational way, which may lead 
said decisions to be less effective (Dean & Sharfman, 1996). Under conditions with 
high demands, managers may narrow the focus of their attention and become even 
more selective with regards to the information to which they pay attention (Broadbent, 
1971; Hockey, 1979). In this way, demands may narrow the lens through which they 
scan the environment and the organization for information relevant to future action. 
They may ignore vital fallible indicators (Hammond, 1996), not gather all the relevant 
information (Dean & Sharfman, 1993) and make less effective decisions (Dean & 
Sharfman, 1996). 
 There is a competing consideration of the effects of executive job demands on 
decision processes. Ganster (2005) notes that while narrowing attention and 




does not necessarily affect decision quality. Rather, people may adaptively respond and 
make the decision process more efficient (Payne, Bettman & Johnson, 1988; Raby & 
Wickens, 1994), and may even eliminate negative biases (Svenson & Benson, 1993). 
While these arguments are compelling, this dissertation sides with the argument that 
even with strong adaptive capacity, individuals tend to perform better under less 
difficult circumstances (Hambrick, Finkelstein & Mooney, 2005b).While individuals 
can work around high demands, they still cannot completely compensate for their 
existence. 
The overall model this dissertation examined is broken into two studies. Study  
1 (shown in Figure 2) looks at the direct and mediated relationships between executive 
job demands and firm outcomes. Study 2 (shown in Figure 3) examines the potential 
for a moderating role for job demands between managerial cognitions and strategic 
outcomes.   With the underlying executive job demands construct outlined, I will now 
propose several hypotheses to test this model. While I use the Hambrick and 
colleagues’ nomenclature of executive job demands, these are assumed to be the 
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 Heightened job demands may approximate the conditions of uncertainty 
(Hambrick et al., 2005a). Uncertainty can lead a manager narrow the lens through 
which they perceive the environment and focus on indicators of the behavior of other 
firms with the intent of mimicking their strategy (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) rather 
than more objectively perceiving the indicators of the state of the environment and 
organization in order to find a strategy more customized to the focal firm. The decision 
of which firms to mimic may be driven by geographic closeness (Galaskiewicz & 
Wasserman, 1989), prestige or visibility (Haveman, 1993). However, these decisions 
may not be made with full consideration of the appropriateness of such behavior for the 
focal firm (Hambrick et al., 2005; Haveman, 1993), potentially creating a less effective 
outcome for the firm than if a fully rational decision had been reached. 
  Managers will take this route because of the easy defensibility of such actions. 
Lack of legitimacy can lead a firm to fail (Singh, Tucker & House, 1986). To achieve 
this legitimacy, firms tend to imitate the behavior of others. This imitation can be easily 
defended to stakeholders because the actions imitated have led to success elsewhere. A 
CEO focused on the ongoing survival of his or her firm and with a narrowed lens due to 
excessive job demands will be more likely to scan for information on the best practices 
of others and implement them because it requires less information, and is seen as 
successful. By performing such mimicry, the firm’s strategy can be seen as conforming 
to that of the rest of the industry.  
 





 At the highest level of demands, narrowed scanning may transition to complete 
desperation (Hambrick et al., 2005a). In this case, the lens goes from being narrowed to 
being distorted. Managers, regardless of the actual threat being faced, may begin to 
perceive all the fallible indicators of the environment as a threat. Given this threat 
interpretation, Staw and colleagues’ threat-rigidity response (1981) may lead the firm to 
behave rigidly and with a greater focus on its prior behavior. This response, as with 
many of the hypothesized responses, is a result of a narrowing of the information 
processing. However, lack of new initiatives and rigid adherence to repeating prior 
actions is not the only possible response when demands are so high that they resemble a 
threat. If managers perceive every indicator as a threat, they will begin framing every 
decision in terms of being a loss situation. Prospect theory would suggest that if every 
decision is seen as a potential loss, managers would be more likely to seek riskier 
alternatives in an attempt to avoid such losses (Khaneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & 
Khaneman, 1981). This outcome has somewhat been shown in the job demands 
literature, with the suggestion that under extreme demands that have fatigued the 
individual, they are more likely to make risky choices (Holding, 1983). 
 Research has suggested that both perspectives are right. Hambrick and D’Aveni 
(1988), in a study of firms as they went bankrupt, found that a certain number of firms 
ceased introducing new strategic initiatives, a problematic response given that 
oftentimes adaptation to a new threat is appropriate (Staw et al., 1981).  Other firms 
engage in domain changing, highly risky initiatives. The full finding in Hambrick & 
D’Aveni is that firms under high pressure seem to vacillate between the two extremes, 




next they make no changes (Hambrick & D’Aveni, 1988; Hambrick et. al., 2005a). 
Applying these findings to the current case, as the demands on managers increase, the 
managers will begin to assess all or most fallible indicators as representing threats. As a 
response to these demands, they will either make sweeping changes to strategy as a 
risk-taking behavior to avoid losses, or they will be overwhelmed and engage in no 
changes to strategy. From year to year, these managers under high demands will 
vacillate from one extreme to the other. Such extreme and vacillating behaviors might 
be conceptualized as higher degrees of strategic dynamism, or degree of change in 
strategy (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990). 
 
H2-Executive job demands are positively related to the amount of change in a firm’s 
strategy (strategic dynamism). 
 
 As suggested above, activation theory would suggest that if the activation level 
associated with a given task is below or above an individual’s normal activation level, 
performance will go down (Gardner, 1986).  Since job demands are expected to 
increase the activation level in an individual (Gardner & Cummings, 1988), job 
demands will increase the activation level and subsequent performance until they 
surpass the individual’s normal activation level, at which point performance would 
decrease. It has also been argued that high achievers also tend to avoid high or low 
challenges, focusing instead on more moderate challenges (McClelland, 1962, 1976). 
This would suggest that achievement would be maximized at the moderate challenge or 
moderate demand level. Prior research has suggested that performance of a given task 





 While there are compelling arguments for a direct inverse-U shaped relationship 
between demands and performance, there is an opposing hypothesis provided by the 
stress literature. Provided that the stressors or demands are challenge based, seen as 
overcomable and such that extra effort will lead to superior performance, it might be 
argued that there would be a direct relationship with stressors and performance such 
that challenge stressors/demands would have a positive relationship with performance 
(LePine et al., 2005). However, there is the reality that tasks with a large number of 
stressors/demands are objectively more difficult. Objectively more difficult tasks tend 
to have less positive results (Ganster, 2005) and so even if the demands themselves 
have a positive outcome on the efforts of the top managers, the outcomes are likely to 
be less positive than those of easier tasks. The interaction of these two effects gives the 
impression of a inverse-U shaped relationship.  
Given the impact top managers have on strategy and therefore subsequent firm 
performance, it may be that these demands-performance relationships will hold at the 
firm level because of the CEO’s performance. Therefore, when demands are very low 
or very high financial performance is likely to be low, but performance is likely to 
grow. This growth will continue as demands increase up to some inflection point and 
then decrease as demands pass that inflection point. 
 




 Given the time and information processing limitations on an individual under 
increasing demands, performance may not be stable, but rather will vary wildly from 




managers to ignore important fallible indicators (Hammond, 1996), leading them to 
gather information that omits relevant facts and make less procedurally rational (and 
therefore less effective) decisions (Dean & Sharfman, 1993, 1996).Incomplete 
information might lead to making a bad choice in one year, but in another year, the 
indicators attended to might lead to a high performing choice, even if only by luck 
(Hambrick et al, 2005a). In this situation, while performance might not be uniformly 
bad, it will be fairly unstable. Conversely, a manager that is able to make procedurally 
rational decisions based upon relevant information would tend to make more uniformly 
effective decisions. 
Prior economics research on group decision making has considered how 
“diversification of opinions” tends to reduce variability of performance (Adams, 
Almeida & Ferreira, 2005; Cheng, 2008; Sah & Stiglitz, 1986, 1991). As more opinions 
are voiced, bad projects are more likely to be rejected as bad. However, good projects 
are also less likely to be accepted as good if there are conflicting opinions. Projects 
selected will tend to be more uniformly performing because there has been consensus 
about the rightness of the decision. This research has also shown that when managers 
make decisions on their own and do not seek consensus, the performance outcomes tend 
to vary more (Adams et al., 2005). A manager under high demands will likely not be 
able to spend as much time seeking consensus amongst constituents. Rather, they will 
have to minimize debate and will not be able to take advantage of the “diversification of 
opinions.” Taken together, these arguments suggest that job demands will lead to more 
variable financial performance. 
 




 The complexity of real organizations may not be captured by the model thus far 
described. The previous research would seem to suggest a direct effect of job demands 
on performance (Janssen, 2001; Wright & Bonett, 1997; Wright & Cropanzano, 1998). 
However, performance is also the outcome of the strategic direction of the firm. To 
better examine how exactly executive job demands might affect firm performance, an 
alternate explanation, that of a mediated relationship, may better explain these 
relationships. It may be fruitful to conceptualize the effect of job demands on firm 
performance as mediated through the effects that job demands has on firm strategy (in 
this dissertation, dynamism and conformity). Firm performance outcomes are 
reflections of the strategic decisions made, thus it is possible that the executive’s job 
demands will have an effect on performance due to their effect on strategic outcomes 
(dynamism and conformity). Therefore, how dynamic a firm’s strategy and how similar 
the firm’s strategy is to that of the rest of the industry mediate the relationship between 
executive job demands and financial performance. 
 
H5a -The relationship between executive job demands and financial performance is 
mediated by strategic conformity. 
 
H5b-The relationship between executive job demands and financial performance is 
mediated by strategic dynamism. 
 
 
 One of the primary arguments used thus far is that high job demands cause a 
narrowing the lens through which the top manager perceives the external environment. 
While this narrowing may lead a manger to rely more heavily on the best practices of 
others, it may also lead that manager to rely more heavily on his or her own past 




there is a relationship between prior experiences of managers (viewed through proxies 
such as functional background, international experience and less direct indicators such 
as age and tenure) and strategic outcomes (Carpenter et al., 2004; Hambrick & Mason, 
1984). If job demands were to narrow the lens through which the top manager perceives 
the environment such that he or she focuses primarily upon fallible indicators that 
mirror previous situations, this relationship between that manager’s past experience 
(measured by demographic proxies) and strategic outcomes may itself become 
strengthened.  
 To examine this potential moderating relationship, I will adapt a previous study 
into how top manager demographics (proxying for their prior experiences [Hambrick & 
Mason, 1984]) relate to the strategic outcomes (strategic dynamism and strategic 
conformity) of this dissertation. Prior research has suggested that top management 
teams (TMT) that have worked in an organization for a long time develop habits that 
lead to them being less willing to institute change (leading to less strategic dynamism) 
and more unlikely to adopt novel or unique strategies (leading strategy to mirror that of 
the rest of the industry, e.g. strategic conformity) (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 19903). 
While no research has directly examined how only the CEO’s tenure is related to 
strategic dynamism and strategic conformity, it seems likely that these relationships 
found for the group will hold for the individual. A CEO in an organization for a long 
time would develop strong habits that would lead to strategies that are less dynamic and 
more strategically in line with other firms in their industry (strategic conformity).  
                                                 
3 Finkelstein and Hambrick (1990) tested how managerial discretion moderated the relationship between 
TMT tenure (proxying for managers’ prior experiences) and the strategic/performance outcomes of 
strategic dynamism, strategic conformity and performance conformity. Using an adapted form of this test 
seems appropriate given that executive job demands have been postulated to be as important a modifier of 





H6a-CEO tenure is positively related to strategic conformity.   
 
H6b-CEO tenure is negatively related to strategic dynamism.  
 
 
 One of the outcomes of habitual behavior by executives is a restriction of 
information processing. By spending a long time in an organization, managers develop 
a set group of responses to a given stimulus, do not look beyond previous sources for 
information and therefore rely more on their past experiences. Given that this effect is, 
in part, driven by a restriction in the indictors they assess, a further restriction (driven 
by executive job demands) may intensify this relationship. Therefore, executive job 
demands are expected to moderate the proposed relationship between CEO tenure and 
the outcomes for strategic conformity. Conversely, if high demands are distorting the 
lens, encouraging managers to perceive the multiple fallible indicators as a threat and 
therefore triggering either the threat-rigidity response (Staw et al., 1981) or causing 
managers to engage in more risk seeking behavior (Khaneman & Tversky, 1979; 
Tversky & Khaneman, 1981) this may overcome their existing habitual preferences. 
While long tenured managers may prefer to continue their existing courses of action, 
reducing the dynamism of their strategy, the perception of threat created by increasing 
demands might weaken those preferences. The resulting outcome would be a lessening 
of the negative relationship between managerial tenure and the amount of change 
(dynamism) in their strategies. 
 
H7a-Executive job demands moderate the relationship between CEO tenure and 
strategic conformity such that as job demands go up the relationship will be more 





H7b-Executive job demands moderate the relationship between CEO tenure and 




 This chapter has used upper echelons thinking and job demands modeling to 
establish the construct of executive job demands, created through the task challenges, 
performance challenges and individual aspirations a manager faces. These demands are 
expected to potentially have direct, moderating and mediated effects on strategic 
processes, firm performance and the turnover of chief executives. With my hypotheses 







 In this chapter, I discuss the methods I used to test the hypotheses proposed for 
the effects executive job demands have with regards to strategic processes and firm 
performance. I describe the sample used.  I then describe how I measure my constructs 
for the dependent, the independent and the control variables plus the sources of data for 
these measurements. Following the operationalization of my constructs, specific 
consideration of the steps used in the construction of my factors is discussed. Finally, I 
discuss the procedures which I used in testing my hypotheses. 
Sampling Frame 
 This dissertation develops a means of estimating executive job demands using 
publically available data, meaning that one requirement for a data sample is that the 
firms within it must be publically traded. Further, in an attempt to avoid an effect of the 
economic downturn on the results, 2005 is the year from which the sample was drawn. 
Because some measures are being taken at t+1 and t+2, setting the year as 2005 should 
avoid most, if not all, of the effects of the recent economic downturn. Therefore, this 
dissertation drew a random sample of 200 firms from the S&P 500 with 2005 as the 
focal year. This was accomplished by using Excel’s random number generator to give 
each company in the S&P 500 a unique number and then going sequentially from 
lowest number up until a sample of 200 companies was drawn. This sample includes 84 







Industries Contained in Sample 
NAICS-4 Industry Name # of Firms 
2111 Oil and Gas Extraction 2
2121 Coal Mining 2
2122 Metal Ore Mining 1
2123 Nonmetallic Mineral Mining and Quarrying 1
2131 Support Activities for Mining 2
2211 
 
Electric Power Generation, Transmission and 
Distribution 14
2212 Natural Gas Distribution 2
2361 Residential Building Construction 1
2371 Utility System Construction 1
2379 Other Heavy and Civil Engineering Construction 1
3112 Grain and Oilseed Milling 3
3114 
 
Fruit and Vegetable Preserving and Specialty Food  
Manufacturing 1
3115 Dairy Product Manufacturing 1
3116 Animal Slaughtering and Processing 1
3118 Bakeries and Tortilla Manufacturing 1
3119 Other Food Manufacturing 2
3121 Beverage Manufacturing 1
3122 Tobacco Manufacturing 2
3152 Cut and Sew Apparel Manufacturing 1
3211 Sawmills and Wood Preservation 1
3221 Pulp, Paper, and Paperboard Mills 4
3222 Converted Paper Product Manufacturing 2
3241 Petroleum and Coal Products Manufacturing 6
3251 Basic Chemical Manufacturing 3
3252 
 
Resin, Synthetic Rubber, and Artificial Synthetic 
Fibers and Filaments Manufacturing 1
3254 Pharmaceutical and Medicine Manufacturing 10
3255 Paint, Coating, and Adhesive Manufacturing 1
3256 
 




Other Chemical Product and Preparation 
Manufacturing 2
3261 Plastics Product Manufacturing 1
3313 
 






TABLE 1 (cont.) 
Industries Contained in Sample 
NAICS-4 Industry Name # of Firms 
3324 
 
Boiler, Tank, and Shipping Container 
Manufacturing 1
3329 Other Fabricated Metal Product Manufacturing 1
3331 
 
Agriculture, Construction, and Mining Machinery 
Manufacturing 3
3332 Industrial Machinery Manufacturing 2
3333 
 




Engine, Turbine, and Power Transmission 
Equipment Manufacturing 1
3339 Other General Purpose Machinery Manufacturing 1
3341 
 
Computer and Peripheral Equipment 
Manufacturing 5
3342 Communications Equipment Manufacturing 3
3344 
 




Navigational, Measuring, Electro-medical, and 
Control Instruments Manufacturing 8
3353 Electrical Equipment Manufacturing 1
3361 Motor Vehicle Manufacturing 1
3363 Motor Vehicle Parts Manufacturing 1
3364 Aerospace Product and Parts Manufacturing 4
3379 Other Furniture Related Product Manufacturing 1
3391 Medical Equipment and Supplies Manufacturing 4
3399 Other Miscellaneous Manufacturing 1
4237 
 
Hardware, and Plumbing and Heating Equipment 
and Supplies Merchant Wholesalers 1
4242 
 
Drugs and Druggists Sundries Merchant 
Wholesalers 2
4413 Automotive Parts, Accessories, and Tire Stores 1
4431 Electronics and Appliance Stores 1
4441 Building Material and Supplies Dealers 1
4451 Grocery Stores 2
4461 Health and Personal Care Stores 2
4481 Clothing Stores 2
4529 Other General Merchandise Stores 3





TABLE 1 (cont.) 
Industries Contained in Sample 
NAICS-4 Industry Name # of Firms 
4831 
 
Deep Sea, Coastal, and Great Lakes Water 
Transportation 1
4862 Pipeline Transportation of Natural Gas 1
5111 
 
Newspaper, Periodical, Book, and Directory 
Publishers 3
5112 Software Publishers 6
5152 Cable and Other Subscription Programming 1
5171 Wired Telecommunications Carriers 1
5172 
 
Wireless Telecommunications Carriers (except 
Satellite) 1
5179 Other Telecommunications 1
5182 Data Processing, Hosting, and Related Services 1
5191 Other Information Services 3
5222 Nondepository Credit Intermediation 1
5231 
 
Securities and Commodity Contracts Intermediation 
and Brokerage 2
5232 Securities and Commodity Exchanges 1
5239 Other Financial Investment Activities 2
5241 Insurance Carriers 18
5311 Lessors of Real Estate 3
5412 
 
Accounting, Tax Preparation, Bookkeeping, and 
Payroll Services 1
5415 Computer Systems Design and Related Services 4
5418 Advertising, Public Relations, and Related Services 2
6214 Outpatient Care Centers 1
6215 Medical and Diagnostic Laboratories 1
6221 General Medical and Surgical Hospitals 1
7211 Traveler Accommodation 2
7221 Full-Service Restaurants 1




 Strategic Conformity. This measure examines how a firm’s strategy with 




industry. These indicators include advertising intensity (advertising expense/sales); 
research and development intensity (R&D expense/sales); selling, general and 
administrative expenses/sales; inventory levels (inventories/sales); leverage 
(debt/equity); and equipment newness (net plant and equipment/gross plant and 
equipment)(cf. Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990; Westphal, Seidel, & Stewart, 2001; 
Zhang & Rajagopalan, 2010). Each indicator is standardized by industry, and the 
absolute difference between a firm’s score and the average industry score for each given 
indicator is calculated4. These absolute distances are multiplied by minus 1 to convert 
the meaning into “conformity” (or the “absence of differences from competitors” 
[Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990: 492]). Finally, a strategic conformity score is created 
by summing the indicators. This data was gathered through Compustat. 
 There is considerable missing data for advertising expense and R&D expenses. 
In some of the industries in my sample no firms reported that data at all. This was also a 
problem for Finkelstein & Hambrick (1990). I applied their solution for the conformity 
and dynamism measures by creating a Strategic Conformity 1 measure  which included 
advertising intensity and  research and development intensity with selling, general and 
administrative expenses/sales, inventory levels, leverage and  a Strategic Conformity 2 
measure that excluded advertising and R&D intensity. Finkelstein and Hambrick did 
find similar results for the two measures. There were only 59 observations for Strategic 
Conformity 1, and the full 200 for Strategic Conformity 2. 
 Strategic Dynamism. Following prior research (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007), 
two measures will be used to assess the degree of change in a firm’s strategy. The first 
                                                 





measure uses the same indicators of resource allocation used in strategic conformity 
(Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990). Unlike strategic conformity, instead of comparing the 
firm’s values against that of the industry, the absolute change of these indicators for the 
firm will be calculated between the focal year (t) and the prior year (t-1). These 
indicators will then be standardized (mean = 0; standard deviation = 1) and summed to 
create a composite measure of dynamism. This data was gathered from Compustat. As 
with strategic conformity, dynamism was gathered as a Dynamism 1 measure (including 
advertising intensity and R&D intensity) and a Dynamism 2 measure (which excluded 
advertising intensity and R&D intensity). There were 54 observations for Dynamism 1 
and the full 200 for Dynamism 2. 
 The second indicator is focused on the number of businesses a firm added or 
dropped from one year to another. Thus the measure is the sum of all four digit NAICS 
industries added or dropped between the focal year (t) and the year before (t-1) 
(Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007). Any change represented a score of one, such that a firm 
that exited one business and entered two others would represent a score of three. This 
data was gathered from Ward’s Business Directory.  
 Financial Performance. Given the inherent weaknesses in any one given 
measure of performance (Venkatraman & Ramanujam, 1986), four measures were used: 
return on assets (net income/total assets), return on equity (net income/shareholders 
equity), return on sales (net income/total sales) and Tobin’s q. Tobin’s q is the sum of 
firm market value (share price multiplied by outstanding shares), the book value of 
long-term debt, the book value of preferred stock and the book value of net current 




gathered at time t+2 since performance outcomes are expected to flow out of the 
strategic behavior. The data came from the Compustat database. 
 Performance Variability. As the measure of how much the firm’s performance 
varies from year to year, prior literature (Adams et al., 2005; Cheng, 2008) suggests that 
variability in performance can be measured by taking the standard deviation of 
measures of firm performance over a sample period. I took measures of ROA, ROE 
ROS and Tobin’s Q beginning at time t (2005) and through to t+3 (2008).This data was 
gathered from the Compustat database.  
Independent Variables 
 Executive Job Demands. Conceptually, executive job demands were proposed 
to come out of the task challenges (elements of the external environment and the 
organization), performance challenges (pressures from owners to perform) and the 
aspirations of the individual executives (Hambrick et al., 2005a). To measure this 
construct, individual factors were created from observable indicators of those three 
elements. Greater discussion of the factor development process can be found below. 
 Task Challenges. Task challenges should begin with elements of the external 
environment. Hambrick et al., (2005a) suggested considering the effects of aspects of 
environmental complexity; which I conceptualized as those aspects mentioned by 
Sharfman and Dean (1991), Kotha and Orne (1989), and Dess and Beard (1984) (see 
Cannon and St. John, 2007 for a review). However, these measures are not appropriate 
given my sample. The reporting of information in the Economic Census for some 
industries differs from that of others. While this study benefits from the breadth of 2-




greater generalizability, it is limited in data available from the economic census for 
certain industries. As a task challenge measure not completely contained within the 
organization itself, I consider the market share of the firm in its primary industry. If a 
firm has a large share of the market in its primary industry, it would be better able to 
exploit economies of scale and potentially better manage rivalry (Porter, 1980). To 
obtain this data, I began by gathering the total industry sales figures from the 2007 
United States Economic Census at the NAICS 4-digit level. I then used the Compustat 
segments data for the firms in my sample to first establish which 4-digit industry the 
majority of their business was in and then to gather the firm’s sales revenue figures for 
that industry. I then divided the firm’s sales in that industry by the total industry sales 
for the market share measure.  
 Considering the elements of task challenges solely presented by internal aspects 
of the organization, the next measure is that of organizational slack. The availability of 
discretionary slack allows a manager to more easily respond to external or internal 
pressures for change, lessening the demands on a manager (Bourgeois, 1981; Sharfman 
et al., 1988). Slack was measured through two ratios: the quick ratio ((Current Assets – 
Inventories)/Current Liabilities) and the current ratio (Current Assets/Current 
Liabilities). Because greater slack would be seen as decreasing job demands, each ratio 
was inverted (1/ratio) to reverse code the measure. These data was gathered via 
Compustat.5 
                                                 
5  A number of firms from the finance and insurance industry (NAICS 52) did not have data entered for 
current assets or current liabilities in Compustat. To gather this data by hand, I consulted with a certified 
public accountant on the SEC rules for balance sheets from financial institutions (FASB Reg SX- Rule 9-




 The next organizational constraint considered that may increase job demands is 
that of diversification. Given that the requirements for control structure and information 
processing increase as a firm becomes more diversified (Hill & Hoskisson, 1987), it 
stands to reason that managing a more diversified firm would be a more demanding job. 
This dissertation used the entropy measure of diversification (Palepu, 1985). The 
measure is as follows: 
 
DT = Total Diversification 
Pi = Share of the ith segment in the total sales of the firm 
N = Number of industry segements a firm operates in 
This data was collected from Compustat’s Segments database. 
 Productivity is the next organizational constraint of interest. If the firm is 
experiencing productivity issues, it may be a sign of managers dealing with a lethargic 
workforce (Mintzberg, 1979). When dealing with such a lethargic workforce, a manager 
must exert more effort to motivate them. Therefore, the job becomes more demanding. 
Productivity was measured by the ratio of firm income to number of employees. Since 
high productivity is thought to reduce demands, the measure was reverse coded by 
inverting the ratio (1/ratio)6. This data was gathered from Compustat. 
 The actual jobs performed by the CEO may affect the task challenges they face. 
Specifically, if a CEO is also the chairperson (CEO duality) and does not have a second 
in command responsible for internal operational activities (COO/President), the 
                                                 
6 Seven of the firms in the sample posted a net loss in 2005.Inverting these negative productivity ratios 
gave some of the lowest scores (which would erroneously suggest low demands) for those firms. To 




demands on an individual may increase. Therefore CEO duality was measured as a 
dichotomous variable in the following way: 1=CEO is Chairperson; 0=CEO and 
Chairperson are separate. Presence of COO/President  was coded in this way: 1=No 
other person with title of COO or President; 0=Person other than the CEO with title of 
COO or President. This data was gathered from the firm’s proxy statements. 
 As the example of William Ford Jr. showed, the strength of a TMT can increase 
or decrease the demands on a CEO. Organizational outcomes are seen as being affected 
by not only a CEO, but the team around that CEO (Bantel & Jackson, 1989; Carpenter 
et al., 2004; Hambrick 2007). Therefore, as a final measure of the task challenges facing 
CEOs, I included measures of functional background heterogeneity, team tenure and 
firm tenure. When identifying members of the top management team, I looked to the 
firm’s 10-K filing from fiscal year 2005 for their listed executive officers. In extreme 
cases where more than 20 individuals were listed, I focused only on those managers of 
SVP level or above (Carpenter et al., 2004). The TMTs in the sample had an average 
team size of  9.25 members. From there I focused on functional background 
heterogeneity. A manager’s functional background, their experience in some primary 
part of the business, has been suggested to shape the way they perceive and react to an 
issue (Carpenter & Fredrickson, 2001; Hambrick, Cho & Chen,1996; Hambrick and 
Mason, 1984). If managers have similar backgrounds, they would bring the same frame 
of reference to a issue, whereas functional background heterogeneity can create more 
diversity of opinion in decision making, leading to more comprehensive and extensive 
decisions (Miller, Burke & Glick, 1998). In high demand situations, a team of managers 




CEO whose lens has either been constricted  or distorted due to other demands. To 
measure this I looked at the biographies of the firm’s named executive officers in 
Capital IQ7. I then identified their earliest work experience. This experience was then 
put into one of nine categories suggested by the literature: marketing; distribution; sales; 
research and development; production; engineering; finance and accounting; law; or 
general8 (Carpenter & Fredrickson, 2001; Wiersema & Bantel, 1992). With this 
categorization of functional backgrounds complete, I then created an index of 
heterogeneity using Blau’s (1977) index, calculated as 1- Σ(Pi)2, where Pi is the 
percentage of individuals in the ith functional background category. 
 TMT tenure in firm and tenure on team captures two different knowledge bases. 
By measuring TMT tenure in the firm, I am establishing the extent to which managers 
have been able to establish relationships with the pertinent stakeholders as well as have 
greater understanding of the inner workings and transformation processes of the 
organization (Hambrick & Fukutomi, 1991). TMT tenure on the top management team 
expresses the ability to get along with, communicate with and trust fellow team 
members (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990). The number of years each team member 
had spent in the firm and as a member of the TMT were both collected and the team 
average of each was used to measure firm and team tenure. It has been argued that long 
tenured teams become more set in their ways and will make decisions based upon that 
habitual behavior (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990). This measure is being used as a 
proxy for knowledge-base. While on its own it may have a certain effect, in this context 
                                                 
7 This data was augmented with data from the 10-K and from Fortune Magazine biographies.  
8 There were a number of HR professionals considered, and they were always considered “General.” 
When deciding how a given job title fit into this coding scheme, the focus was always on the idea of 
heterogeneity within the firm. Thus the most important part of categorizing these jobs was to put similar 




it is being seen as a resource (using the JD-R terminology) as a result, teams with high 
functional background heterogeneity, high firm tenure and high team tenure would be 
seen as reducing demands, and therefore the inverse (1/measure) of these measures is 
used. 
 Performance Challenges. Performance challenges are seen as the demands 
placed on managers by the owners for a given level of performance. As such, it is 
thought that with strong agency conditions (i.e. strong monitoring ) there will be  
stronger performance challenges for the executives and therefore stronger job demands. 
These strong monitoring conditions will be operationalized by the following four 
indicators. First is the number of outside members9 of the board divided by total board 
size (Morck et al., 1989). This is based on the assumption that outside members of the 
board are expected to challenge the CEOs decisions more than board members working 
within the company. Second is the number of outside directors appointed before the 
CEO takes his or her position divided by the total number of outside board members. 
There is a thought that even though those board members are not part of the 
management team, they may still feel a sense of indebtedness to the CEO for putting 
them on the board due to the CEO’s influence over the nominating process (Wade, 
O’Reilly and Chandratat, 1990). Third is the ownership stake of the outside directors 
which is operationalized by the sum of the outside directors’ equity holdings divided by 
the common shares outstanding. The data for the previous three measures were found in 
the Riskmetrics database. The common shares outstanding data was gathered through 
                                                 
9 Riskmetics refers to some board members as “Linked.” In these situations, I examined the proxy 
statements to assess if these board members satisfied the NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ definitions of 




Compustat. When outside owners have a high equity stake, they become more focused 
on the interests of the owners, especially the interests of profit maximization (Bergh, 
1995; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Johnson, Hoskisson & Hitt, 1993). The final measure is 
the percentage of institutional ownership data which was found on Capital IQ. 
Institutional investors tend to be closer monitors of the firm and compel tighter control 
from the board on the company (Davis & Thompson, 1994). 
 Executive Aspirations. Executive aspirations, as this dissertation has viewed 
them, represent internal motivation based upon the manager’s need for achievement and 
their reward seeking behaviors. Therefore, this construct was measured with observable 
indicators of such cognitions. On the Manifest Need Questionnaire (Steers & 
Braunstein, 1976) scale for need for achievement, items include such things as “I take 
moderate risks and stick my neck out to get ahead at work” and the reverse coded “I try 
to avoid any added responsibilities on my job” (254). To capture the ideas of moderate 
risk, effort to get ahead and adding responsibilities, the following measures were used. 
First, as a measure of putting forth effort to get ahead, CEO educational level will be 
measured using a seven-point scale based on the highest degree earned (Datta & 
Rajagopalan, 1998): 1=high school; 2=some college; 3=undergraduate degree; 4=some 
graduate school, 5=masters degree; 6=attended doctoral program and 7=doctorate 
degree. This data was gathered from the Capital IQ biographies of the CEOs with 
occasional augmentation from Fortune Magazine’s biographies. As a measure of adding 
responsibilities, the age the focal CEO took his or her first job as CEO was divided by 
the average age of accession to the CEO role in the industry as a means of measuring 




(1/x) since a smaller value (i.e. younger age of accession) indicates greater aspiration. 
For the industry comparison, data was gathered on CEOs at the 20 largest (by revenue) 
firms within their 2-digit NAICS industry. This data was also gathered through the 
Capital IQ CEO biographies. Finally, as measure of risk seeking behavior, prior 
involvement with a entrepreneurial start-up was gathered for each CEO: 1=prior 
involvement with an entrepreneurial start-up; 0=no involvement with an entrepreneurial 
start up. This data was gathered from Capital IQ’s CEO biographies. Very few (13 out 
of the 200) CEOs had prior entrepreneurial experience. Of those 13, seven were the 
founders of those firms. At least within the S&P 500, a majority of CEOs appear to 
have been part of the firm they are leading for a considerable amount of time. 
 With regards to the reward seeking behavior of top executives, to the degree that 
the executive is motivated by money and the amount said executive’s pay is tied to 
performance, the higher their aspirations to achieve firm goals (Eisenhardt, 1989; Fama 
& Jensen, 1983). This was operationalized by first gathering the percentage of incentive 
pay (yearly incentive bonus) a CEO received out of their target amount of incentive pay 
authorized10. This percentage was then divided by the industry average of the 
percentage of incentive pay achieved. For the industry comparison, data was gathered 
on CEOs at the 20 largest (by revenue) firms within their 2-digit NAICS industry. This 
data was gathered from the firm’s proxy statements. 
                                                 
10 Some firms did not explicitly state the amount of the CEO’s bonus target. Those firms that did state a 
target generally had a target of between 1 and 2 times of base salary. For those firms that did not 
explicitly state the amount, the base salary of the CEO was entered as the target amount. Following data 
collection, I ran an ANOVA comparing the stated targets with the unstated targets and found there was a 
statistically significant difference between the two. Trying different multipliers of base salary used by 
other firms in the sample (1.1x, 1.25x and 1.5x base salary) I found no significant difference between the 




 CEO Tenure. CEO tenure was measured as the total number of years the CEO 
has spent in the organization. This data was gathered from the Capital IQ biographies of 
the CEOs. 
Control Variables 
 Firm Size. Size of a firm has been shown to affect performance (Kimberly, 
1976). Further, size has been shown to predict strategic activity, suggesting that they are 
more likely to behave mimetically (Deephouse, 1999; Fligstein, 1991; Westphal et al., 
2001), and have difficulties effecting change (Aldrich, 1979; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 
1990). While there are many possible measures of size, this dissertation measured size 
as the natural log of number of employees because more employees are seen as creating 
a large amount of bureaucratic momentum (Mintzberg, 1979). The natural log is used 
because the distribution is generally skewed. This data was collected through the 
Compustat database. 
 Firm Age. The age of a firm has been show to affect the amount of change that 
organization undergoes (Delacroix & Swaminathan, 1991; Haveman, 1993). It is 
possible that as a firm ages it develops greater bureaucracy making radical changes to 
strategy more difficult. Therefore, age of firm, as measured from date of incorporation, 
is included as a control in appropriate analyses. This data was collected through the 
Capital IQ database. 
 CEO Age. The age of a CEO can have an effect on their strategic behavior, 
leading to less dynamic strategies with a greater tendency towards conformity 




the appropriate analyses as a control. Data for this variable was collected from the 
CEO’s biography on Capital IQ. 
Factor Creation 
In creating the factors used in this study, I engaged in a five step process. First, I 
converted the variables into z-scores which standardizes the variables and allows better 
comparability between differing scales. Next, I performed an obliminal factor analysis. 
Oblique rotation (oblimin) is used so as to not force orthogonality and allow better 
understanding of the actual interrelationships between the factors. With this analysis 
performed I examined the factor structure to see if certain items were loading across 
multiple factors. If there are such cross loading items, they were removed. Finally, I 
performed an alpha analysis to insure the internal consistency of the factor.  
Analysis Technique 
 OLS regression was used to test my hypotheses due to its robustness in showing 
both linear and non-linear relationships between multiple variables. These analyses 
were done hierarchically with stage 1 as control variables, stage 2 being task challenges, 
stage 3 being performance challenges and stage 4 being executive aspirations. To test 
my mediated model (hypotheses 5a-b), I used the Baron and Kenny (1986) three 
equation model to establish mediation. I did a further test of Hypotheses 1, 2, 3 and 5a-b 
using a maximum likelihood estimation SEM analysis. This analysis was performed by 
estimating the measurement model and structural model simultaneously to better 





Analysis and Results 
With the data collected as described in the preceding chapter, I used factor 
analysis to create factors with which I tested my hypotheses. I additionally analyzed 
said data to insure that it meets the assumptions for OLS. Transformations for non-
normal data were performed, leading to variables that fell within accepted parameters. I 
then used the previously described analysis techniques to test my hypotheses.  
Factor Analysis 
Before performing factor analysis, I examined the consistency of the scales 
being constructed. Table 2 contains the Cronbach’s alpha statistics for the Task 
Challenges, Performance Challenges and Executive Aspirations scales. Both Task 
Challenges and Performance Challenges had an alpha of above 0.70, suggesting that 
the measures are internally consistent (Hair, Anderson, Tatham & Black, 1998). 
However, the variables in the Executive Aspirations are not only well below the 0.70 
threshold, but are also negative, which may indicate that the items are reversed. 
Conceptually, these variables should move together (The better educated, the more 
entrepreneurial, the inverse of the age you are at accession and the more striving you 
have towards incentive pay, the greater your aspirations), but the alpha does not 
indicate such a relationship. Further analysis was performed without the 
entrepreneurship variable as a means of testing if the outcome was affected by the 
presence of a binary variable. However, the alpha remained negative. Therefore this 
scale seemed inappropriate for further analysis and was not computed. The 








Factor Name Factor Components Cronbach's alpha 
Task Challenges  
Market Share, Quick Ratio, Current Ratio, 
Diversification, Productivity, Presence of 
COO/President, CEO Duality, TMT 
Heterogenity, TMT Tenure in Firm, TMT 
Tenure on Team 0.72
Performance 
Challenges 
Outside Directors, Outside Directors 
Appointed before CEO, Board Stock 
Ownership, Institutional Ownership 0.76
Executive 
Aspirations 
CEO Education Level, CEO 
Entrepreneurship, Age Became CEO, 
CEO Incentive Pay Achieved -0.11
 
Following these analyses, I performed a factor analysis on the Task Challenge 
variables. These variables had been converted to z-scores in order to standardize the 
variables so that the communalities between said variables could be better seen.  Using 
the Kaiser Criterion (Kaiser, 1960), four factors had Eigenvalues above 1 and were 
therefore retained. These four factors also had a cumulative percentage of 62 percent of 
variance explained. The factor loadings found in table 3 were arrived at through a 
principal component analysis with oblimin rotation so that orthogonality would not be 
forced and that the interrelationships between the factors would be preserved. Using 






Task Challenges Factor Loadings 
  1 2 3 4 
Market Share -.458 .437 -.187 .219 
Quick Ratio .925 -.142 .153 -.287 
Current Ratio .918 -.086 .125 -.170 
Diversification .244 -.208 .648 -.039 
Productivity .318 -.009 .237 -.682 
Presence of COO .019 .193 .786 -.043 
CEO Duality .280 -.474 -.309 .104 
TMT Heterogeneity -.109 .062 .064 .821 
TMT Firm Tenure -.210 .804 -.155 -.127 
TMT Team Tenure .209 .653 .229 .236 
 
Similar analyses were performed on the Performance Challenges variables 
(which had, like the Task Challenges variables, been converted to z-scores in order to 
make communalities between variables more apparent). With these variables, the 
Kaiser Criterion suggested a two factor solution which represented a cumulative 
percentage of 58 percent of variance explained. The factor loadings found in table 4 
were once again created using a principal component analysis with oblimin rotation. 
The variables for the two factors were generated using regression techniques as was 
done for Task Challenges. 
TABLE 4 
Performance Challenges Factor Loadings 
  1 2 
Outside Directors .699 .423 
Outside Directors Appointed before CEO .055 .814 
Board Stock Ownership .054 .514 





Normality Analysis and Transformations 
 With my factor scores in place, I then examined descriptive statistics (see Table 
5) and looked at the histograms (found in appendix 1) of my independent, dependent 
and control variables. In general, I was examining the histograms to get a feel for how 
normally distributed my variables were and examining the descriptive statistics for 
skewness and kurtosis. 
TABLE 5 
Descriptive Statistics for Pre-Transformed Variables 
Variable N Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
Conformity Measure 1 59 3.27 1.67 1.54 1.84
Conformity Measure 2 200 2.23 1.91 5.80 43.07
Dynamism Measure 1 54 -0.06 2.16 2.93 9.40
Dynamism Measure 2 200 0.00 2.04 5.01 28.99
2007 ROA 200 0.07 0.08 -1.47 11.41
2007 ROE 200 0.19 0.35 2.02 17.30
2007 ROS 200 0.08 0.15 -2.56 12.03
2007 Tobin's Q 200 1.91 1.25 2.53 9.07
ROA Variability 200 0.04 0.05 2.99 10.22
ROE Variability 200 0.26 1.38 12.96 176.35
ROS Variability 200 0.10 0.45 12.45 167.10
Tobin's Q Variability 200 0.41 0.48 3.23 14.12
Task Challenges 1 200 0.00 1.00 -0.85 1.10
Task Challenges 2 200 0.00 1.00 0.23 0.08
Task Challenges 3 200 0.00 1.00 0.10 -0.78
Task Challenges 4 200 0.00 1.00 1.63 6.70
Performance Challenges 1 200 0.00 1.00 -0.98 0.68
Performance Challenges 2 200 0.00 1.00 -0.50 1.38
CEO Education Level 200 4.80 1.47 0.10 -1.04
Entrepreneur CEO 200 0.07 0.25 3.56 10.75
Age Became CEO 200 0.96 0.13 -0.21 -0.11
CEO Incentive Pay 200 0.96 0.56 1.62 5.93
CEO Tenure 200 17.66 11.99 0.34 -1.00
Firm Age 200 68.93 44.39 0.59 -0.13
Firm Size 200 2.94 1.39 -0.03 -0.06




The traditional rule of thumb in evaluating normality is that skewness and 
kurtosis should both be in the -3 to 3 range. All of my dependent variables are highly 
leptokurtic with kurtosis scores into the hundreds. Hair and colleagues (1998) suggest a 
variety of fixes to data that is non-normal; primarily logarithmic, square root and 
inversion. I began by applying natural logarithm transformations to my variables.  
TABLE 6 
Descriptive Statistics for Transformed Variables 
Variable N Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
Conformity Measure 1 (Log) 59 0.47 0.19 0.67 -0.08
Conformity Measure 2 (Log) 200 0.28 0.22 1.09 3.62
Dynamism Measure 1 (Log) 54 0.12 0.37 0.14 0.85
Dynamism Measure 2 (Log) 200 0.21 0.23 1.61 4.08
2007 ROA (Log) 200 1.00 0.00 -1.60 12.20
2007 ROE (Log) 200 1.01 0.01 1.27 15.16
2007 ROS (Log) 200 1.00 0.01 -2.73 12.87
2007 Tobin's Q (Log) 200 0.21 0.24 0.30 0.70
ROA Variability (Log) 200 -1.70 0.48 0.11 -0.10
ROE Variability (Log) 200 -1.15 0.57 0.65 1.31
ROS Variability (Log) 200 -1.57 0.65 0.38 0.26
Tobin's Q Variability (Log) 200 -0.60 0.45 -0.31 0.33
Task Challenges 1 200 0.00 1.00 -0.85 1.10
Task Challenges 2 200 0.00 1.00 0.23 0.08
Task Challenges 3 200 0.00 1.00 0.10 -0.78
Task Challenges 4 200 0.69 0.08 0.40 6.70
Performance Challenges 1 200 0.00 1.00 -0.98 0.68
Performance Challenges 2 200 0.00 1.00 -0.50 1.38
CEO Education Level 200 4.80 1.47 0.10 -1.04
Entrepreneur CEO 200 0.07 0.25 3.56 10.75
Age Became CEO 200 0.96 0.13 -0.21 -0.11
CEO Incentive Pay (SQRT) 200 0.93 0.30 -0.38 2.29
CEO Tenure (SQRT) 200 3.89 1.59 -0.28 -0.83
Firm Age (SQRT) 200 7.82 2.80 -0.02 -0.89
Firm Size 200 2.94 1.39 -0.03 -0.06





Because a logarithm cannot be taken of a 0 or negative number, a constant of 10 was 
added to ROA, ROE and ROS. While these transformations improved my skewness 
numbers, kurtosis continued to be high. I then tried a square root transformation, and 
reflect natural log square root transformations (where I would take the natural log or 
square root of (1+Max Value of Variable)-Variable). While the square root 
transformation gave a more normal distribution for CEO incentive pay, CEO tenure and 
the firm age variables, in general the natural log transformation gave the most 
normalized results for the variables. No transformation was attempted for the CEO 
Entrepreneur variable because its high skewness and kurtosis scores are a result of it 
being a binary variable. The descriptive statistics for my transformed variables can be 
found in Table 6 and the histograms can be found in appendix 2. 
Industry Controls 
 In addition to the control variables discussed in chapter 3, I additionally 
controlled for industry in my regressions. However, given that my sample includes 84 
different four-digit NAICS industries (and 15 different two-digit NAICS industries), it 
would be impractical to include dummy variables for each industry (and would quickly 
erode my degrees of freedom). Therefore, taking from Sharfman & Fernando (2008), I 
analyzed my dependent variables with an ANOVA to see if there was a significant 
difference by industry. For the purposes of this analysis, I used a firm’s two-digit 
NAICS industry as the independent variable in these ANOVAs because SPSS cannot 
run post-hoc analyses on ANOVAs with more than 50 groups. The results of these 











Square F Sig. 
Between Groups .592 8 .074 2.439 .026
Within Groups 1.517 50 .030
Total 2.109 58    
 
TABLE 8 





Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 1.505 15 .100 2.380 .004
Within Groups 7.757 184 .042
Total 9.262 199    
 
TABLE 9 





Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 2.377 8 .297 2.670 .017
Within Groups 5.009 45 .111
Total 7.386 53    
 
TABLE 10 





Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 1.211 15 .081 1.530 .098
Within Groups 9.713 184 .053












Square F Sig. 
Between Groups .000 15 .000 .754 .727
Within Groups .002 184 .000
Total .002 199    
 
TABLE 12 





Square F Sig. 
Between Groups .004 15 .000 1.423 .140
Within Groups .037 184 .000
Total .041 199    
 
TABLE 13 





Square F Sig. 
Between Groups .000 15 .000 .603 .870









Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 2.670 15 .178 3.902 .000
Within Groups 8.392 184 .046












Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 8.656 15 .577 2.879 .000
Within Groups 36.879 184 .200
Total 45.534 199    
 
TABLE 16 





Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 5.372 15 .358 1.127 .334
Within Groups 58.447 184 .318
Total 63.819 199    
 
TABLE 17 





Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 22.699 15 1.513 4.556 .000
Within Groups 61.113 184 .332
Total 83.811 199    
 
TABLE 18 





Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 15.692 15 1.046 7.906 .000
Within Groups 24.348 184 .132
Total 40.040 199    
 
As seen in tables 7 through 18, the Conformity 1, Conformity 2, Dynamism 1, 




significant differences by industry. Because significant differences exist, I performed 
Bonferroni post-hoc tests to see in what industries there were significant differences. In 
the case of the Conformity 1 measure, NAICS industry 32 (Manufacturing) was found 
to be different from the other industries. For Conformity 2, NAICS industry 48 
(Transportation and Warehousing) and 52 (Finance and Insurance) were different. 
Dynamism 1 was found to have significant differences for NAICS industry 45 (Retail 
Trade). Tobin’s Q 2007 and Tobin’s Q Variability had differences in NAICS industries 
22 (Utilities) and 52 (Finance and Insurance).For ROA Variability there was a 
significant difference in NAICS industry 22 (Utilities).Finally, there was a significant 
difference in ROS Variability in NAICS industries 42 (Wholesale Trade), 44 (Retail 
Trade) and 52 (Finance and Insurance). Dummy variables were created for each 
industry with 1 for the industries with a significant difference and 0 for the industries 
without. 
Correlation Tables 
 As a final check before running my regressions, I looked at the correlation tables 
to insure that unrelated variables were not overly correlated. Variables that are overly 
correlated can lead to multicollinearity, which makes it difficult to add explanatory 
power due to greater shared variance and less unique variance amongst variables in my 
model (Hair et al., 1998). As seen in Table 19, most of the highly correlated variables 
will not appear together in the regressions. Of concern are some of the squared terms 
and their base variables (especially with the Executive Aspirations variables) as well as 






Correlation Matrix For Independent, Dependent and Control Variables 
  Variable 1   2   3   4   5   6   
1 Conformity Measure 1             
2 Conformity Measure 2 0.80 ***           
3 Dynamism Measure 1 0.27 * 0.23 +         
4 Dynamism Measure 2 0.15  0.33 *** 0.87 ***       
5 2007 ROA -0.02  -0.12 + -0.27 + -0.19 **     
6 2007 ROE 0.03  -0.13 + -0.10  -0.08  0.57 ***   
7 2007 ROS -0.06  -0.15 * -0.17  -0.22 ** 0.76 *** 0.52 *** 
8 2007 Tobin's Q -0.07  -0.21 ** -0.08  -0.14 * 0.61 *** 0.25 *** 
9 ROA Variability 0.16  0.07  0.41 ** 0.21 ** -0.10  -0.18 * 
10 ROE Variability 0.19  0.19 ** 0.55 *** 0.32 *** -0.24 *** 0.00  
11 ROS Variability 0.21  0.33 *** 0.47 *** 0.30 *** -0.32 *** -0.31 *** 
12 Tobin's Q Variability -0.14  -0.18 * 0.00  -0.05  0.34 *** 0.04  
13 Task Challenges 1 -0.19  -0.05  -0.23 + 0.01  -0.10  0.13 + 
14 Task Challenges 1 Squared 0.27 * 0.10  0.01  -0.02  0.11  -0.12 + 
15 Task Challenges 2 0.14  0.13 + 0.36 ** 0.24 *** -0.22 ** -0.18 * 
16 Task Challenges 2 Squared -0.17  0.05  0.04  0.10  -0.19 ** -0.11  
17 Task Challenges 3 0.00  0.06  0.03  0.12 + 0.09  0.10  
18 Task Challenges 3 Squared -0.24 + 0.15 * -0.09  0.11  -0.04  -0.03  
19 Task Challenges 4 0.09  0.22 ** 0.30 * 0.10  0.01  -0.14 * 
20 Task Challenges 4 Squared 0.18  0.34 *** 0.00  0.31 *** -0.08  -0.11  
21 Performance Challenges 1 0.02  0.14 * 0.16  0.14 + -0.12 + -0.06  






Table 19 (cont.) 
Correlation Matrix For Independent, Dependent and Control Variables 
  Variable 1  2  3   4  5  6  
23 Performance Challenges 2 -0.04  0.01  0.03  0.07 0.12 + 0.05
24 Performance Challenges 2 Squared -0.20  -0.03  0.17  0.00 0.02  0.04
25 CEO Education Level 0.19  0.02  0.21  0.04 -0.09  0.04
26 CEO Education Level Squared 0.20  0.01  0.20  0.02 -0.09  0.04
27 Entrepreneur CEO 0.27 * 0.01  0.03  -0.04 -0.07  0.06
28 Age Became CEO -0.25 + -0.11  -0.13  -0.11 -0.01  -0.02
29 Age Became CEO Squared -0.23 + -0.10  -0.12  -0.11 -0.03  -0.02
30 CEO Incentive Pay -0.16  -0.03  -0.23 + -0.02  0.10  0.00
31 CEO Incentive Pay Squared -0.18  -0.02  -0.30 * -0.05  0.13 + -0.03
32 CEO Tenure -0.08  -0.05  -0.24 + -0.12 + 0.07  0.09  
33 Tenure x Task Challenges 1 -0.22 + -0.03  -0.27 * -0.01  -0.10  0.08  
34 Tenure x Task Challenges 2 0.18  0.14 * 0.33 * 0.22 ** -0.18 * -0.15 * 
35 Tenure x Task Challenges 3 -0.01  0.06  0.05  0.10  0.09  0.09  
36 Tenure x Task Challenges 4 0.14 0.19 ** 0.39 ** 0.12 + 0.03  -0.10  
37 Tenure x Performance Challenges 1 0.06 0.15 * 0.18  0.16 * -0.12 + -0.05  
38 Tenure x Performance Challenges 2 0.00 0.03  0.12  0.06  0.09  0.02  
39 Tenure x CEO Education Level 0.12 0.00  -0.05  -0.07  0.02  0.10  
40 Tenure x Age Became CEO -0.12 -0.07  -0.28 * -0.15 * 0.06  0.07  
41 Tenure x CEO Incentive Pay -0.16 -0.05  -0.34 * -0.10  0.11 0.07  
42 Firm Age -0.15 -0.08  -0.46 *** -0.15 * 0.06 0.15 * 
43 Firm Size -0.02 -0.01  -0.29 * 0.01  -0.02 0.06
44 CEO Age -0.19  -0.16 * -0.13   -0.18 * -0.02  0.01  





Table 19 (cont.) 
Correlation Matrix For Independent, Dependent and Control Variables 
  Variable 7   8   9   10   11   12   
7 2007 ROS             
8 2007 Tobin's Q 0.41 ***           
9 ROA Variability -0.16 * 0.16 *         
10 ROE Variability -0.31 *** -0.09  0.72 ***       
11 ROS Variability -0.21 ** -0.23 ** 0.74 *** 0.65 ***     
12 Tobin's Q Variability 0.13 + 0.68 *** 0.42 *** 0.07  0.03    
13 Task Challenges 1 -0.02  -0.25 *** -0.34 *** -0.13 + -0.36 *** -0.34 ***
14 Task Challenges 1 Squared 0.06  0.18 ** 0.12 + 0.05  0.16 * 0.19 ** 
15 Task Challenges 2 -0.24 *** -0.12 + 0.20 ** 0.19 ** 0.35 *** -0.04  
16 Task Challenges 2 Squared -0.28 *** -0.13 + 0.08  0.12 + 0.10  -0.11  
17 Task Challenges 3 0.02  -0.06  0.04  0.11  -0.04  -0.13 + 
18 Task Challenges 3 Squared 0.07  -0.02  0.09  0.07  0.12 + -0.04  
19 Task Challenges 4 0.03  -0.14 * -0.04  0.06  0.25 *** -0.15 * 
20 Task Challenges 4 Squared -0.13 + -0.17 * 0.02  0.14 * 0.20 ** -0.14 + 
21 Performance Challenges 1 -0.14 * -0.13 + 0.20 ** 0.24 *** 0.18 * 0.00  
22 Performance Challenges 1 Squared 0.07  0.13 + -0.15 * -0.22 ** -0.14 * 0.00  
23 Performance Challenges 2 0.10  0.10  0.01  -0.03  -0.04  0.03  
24 Performance Challenges 2 Squared 0.06  0.02  -0.08  -0.06  -0.04  -0.02  
25 CEO Education Level -0.02  -0.19 ** -0.04  0.07  0.01  -0.13 + 
26 CEO Education Level Squared -0.02  -0.19 ** -0.04  0.07  0.02  -0.12 + 
27 Entrepreneur CEO -0.06  -0.03  0.01  0.00  0.01  0.04  
28 Age Became CEO 0.05  -0.09  -0.09  -0.08  -0.10 -0.16 * 
29 Age Became CEO Squared 0.03  -0.09  -0.08  -0.08  -0.09 -0.15 * 






Table 19 (cont.) 
Correlation Matrix For Independent, Dependent and Control Variables 
  Variable 7   8   9   10   11   12   
31 CEO Incentive Pay Squared 0.15 * 0.14 * -0.13 + -0.10  -0.15 * 0.12 + 
32 CEO Tenure 0.08  -0.02  -0.23 ** -0.21 ** -0.28 *** -0.14 + 
33 Tenure x Task Challenges 1 -0.09  -0.22 ** -0.34 *** -0.16 * -0.35 *** -0.29 ***
34 Tenure x Task Challenges 2 -0.14 * -0.07  0.18 * 0.16 * 0.32 *** -0.03  
35 Tenure x Task Challenges 3 -0.01  -0.03  0.03  0.14 * -0.03  -0.12 + 
36 Tenure x Task Challenges 4 0.08  -0.09  -0.03  0.05  0.22 ** -0.14 + 
37 Tenure x Performance Challenges 1 -0.14 * -0.10  0.19 ** 0.24 *** 0.18 * 0.02  
38 Tenure x Performance Challenges 2 0.06  0.08  -0.01  -0.05  -0.04  0.02  
39 Tenure x CEO Education Level 0.08  -0.11  -0.19 ** -0.10  -0.21 ** -0.18 ** 
40 Tenure x Age Became CEO 0.08  -0.04  -0.24 *** -0.22 *** -0.29 *** -0.16 * 
41 Tenure x CEO Incentive Pay 0.12 + 0.06  -0.26 *** -0.23 ** -0.30 *** -0.02  
42 Firm Age -0.03 -0.01  -0.24 *** -0.15 * -0.41 *** -0.14 * 
43 Firm Size 0.00 -0.15 * -0.30 *** -0.12 + -0.29 *** -0.30 ***






Table 19 (cont.) 
Correlation Matrix For Independent, Dependent and Control Variables 
  Variable 13   14   15   16   17   18   
13 Task Challenges 1    
14 Task Challenges 1 Squared -0.48 ***     
15 Task Challenges 2 -0.18 * 0.06     
16 Task Challenges 2 Squared 0.03  -0.03  0.16 *   
17 Task Challenges 3 0.15 * -0.19 ** 0.07  0.09   
18 Task Challenges 3 Squared 0.04  0.06  -0.05  0.07  0.09  
19 Task Challenges 4 -0.14 + 0.16 * 0.04  0.00  -0.06  0.00
20 Task Challenges 4 Squared 0.02  0.08  0.11  0.00  0.04  -0.11
21 Performance Challenges 1 -0.01  -0.09  0.17 * 0.10  0.01  -0.01
22 Performance Challenges 1 Squared -0.12 + 0.07  0.00  -0.05  0.03  -0.03
23 Performance Challenges 2 0.05  0.10  0.21 ** 0.07  0.22 ** 0.03
24 Performance Challenges 2 Squared 0.03  -0.08  0.05  -0.06  -0.02  -0.07
25 CEO Education Level 0.03  0.07  0.08  -0.02  -0.04  0.02
26 CEO Education Level Squared 0.02  0.07  0.08  -0.02  -0.07  0.01
27 Entrepreneur CEO -0.11  0.24 *** 0.04  -0.11  -0.20 ** -0.01
28 Age Became CEO 0.20 ** -0.07  -0.13 + 0.05  0.05  0.05
29 Age Became CEO Squared 0.19 ** -0.07  -0.13 + 0.05  0.03  0.05
30 CEO Incentive Pay 0.19 ** -0.07  -0.12 + -0.06  0.01  0.05
31 CEO Incentive Pay Squared 0.15 * -0.03  -0.11  -0.09  -0.01  0.02
32 CEO Tenure 0.18 * -0.10  -0.58 *** -0.03  0.00  -0.02
33 Tenure x Task Challenges 1 0.93 *** -0.42 *** -0.20 ** 0.08  0.11  0.01
34 Tenure x Task Challenges 2 -0.19 ** 0.08  0.93 *** -0.12 + 0.03  -0.09





Table 19 (cont.) 
Correlation Matrix For Independent, Dependent and Control Variables 
  Variable 13   14   15   16   17   18   
36 Tenure x Task Challenges 4 -0.10  0.15 * 0.06  -0.04 -0.01  0.01
37 Tenure x Performance Challenges 1 -0.02  -0.09  0.17 * 0.05 0.06  0.00
38 Tenure x Performance Challenges 2 0.04  0.09  0.18 * 0.03 0.20 ** 0.00
39 Tenure x CEO Education Level 0.14 * -0.02  -0.43 *** -0.06 -0.03  0.00
40 Tenure x Age Became CEO 0.21 ** -0.10  -0.56 *** 0.00 0.03  -0.01
41 Tenure x CEO Incentive Pay 0.24 *** -0.12 + -0.49 *** -0.04 0.01  0.01
42 Firm Age 0.58 *** -0.32 *** -0.32 *** 0.05 0.31 *** -0.02
43 Firm Size 0.41 *** -0.29 *** -0.29 *** 0.08 0.25 *** 0.00
44 CEO Age 0.07   -0.04  -0.34 *** 0.04  -0.23 ** 0.09  
 
Table 19 (cont.) 
Correlation Matrix For Independent, Dependent and Control Variables 
  Variable 19   20   21   22   23   24   
19 Task Challenges 4             
20 Task Challenges 4 Squared 0.55 ***  
21 Performance Challenges 1 0.04  0.09    
22 Performance Challenges 1 Squared -0.01  0.02 -0.60 ***   
23 Performance Challenges 2 0.05  0.09 0.11  -0.10   
24 Performance Challenges 2 Squared -0.08  -0.04 -0.33 *** 0.33 *** -0.28 *** 
25 CEO Education Level 0.18 * 0.06 0.09  -0.13 + 0.16 * -0.11
26 CEO Education Level Squared 0.18 * 0.05 0.08  -0.11  0.13 + -0.10
27 Entrepreneur CEO -0.02  0.04 -0.02  -0.02  -0.18 ** 0.00
28 Age Became CEO 0.13 + 0.04 0.02  -0.12  0.20 ** -0.09





Table 19 (cont.) 
Correlation Matrix For Independent, Dependent and Control Variables 
  Variable 19   20   21   22   23   24   
30 CEO Incentive Pay 0.15 * 0.03  0.00  0.08  -0.03  0.06  
31 CEO Incentive Pay Squared 0.10  0.04  -0.03  0.10  -0.06  0.06  
32 CEO Tenure 0.03  -0.06  -0.19 ** 0.01  -0.28 *** -0.01  
33 Tenure x Task Challenges 1 -0.10  0.03  -0.02  -0.11  0.04  0.02  
34 Tenure x Task Challenges 2 0.06  0.08  0.17 * 0.02  0.18 * 0.05  
35 Tenure x Task Challenges 3 -0.01  0.03  0.06  -0.01  0.20 ** -0.08  
36 Tenure x Task Challenges 4 0.91 *** 0.44 *** 0.00  -0.02  0.10  -0.05  
37 Tenure x Performance Challenges 1 0.00  0.04  0.92 *** -0.58 *** 0.11  -0.27 ***
38 Tenure x Performance Challenges 2 0.09  0.08  0.11  -0.16 * 0.93 *** -0.32 ***
39 Tenure x CEO Education Level 0.16 * 0.00  -0.11  -0.07  -0.13 + -0.08  
40 Tenure x Age Became CEO 0.07  -0.05  -0.17 * -0.02  -0.16 * -0.05  
41 Tenure x CEO Incentive Pay 0.09  -0.02  -0.17 * 0.08  -0.25 *** 0.05  
42 Firm Age -0.31 *** 0.01  -0.10  0.03  0.01  -0.01  
43 Firm Size 0.12 + 0.13 + -0.02  -0.04  0.10  -0.14 + 







Table 19 (cont.) 
Correlation Matrix For Independent, Dependent and Control Variables 
  Variable 25   26   27   28   29   30   
25 CEO Education Level             
26 CEO Education Level Squared 0.99 ***  
27 Entrepreneur CEO 0.02  0.05  
28 Age Became CEO 0.08  0.06  -0.31 ***  
29 Age Became CEO Squared 0.06  0.05  -0.29 *** 1.00 ***
30 CEO Incentive Pay -0.05  -0.04  -0.01  0.04  0.04  
31 CEO Incentive Pay Squared -0.11  -0.09  0.04  -0.02  -0.02  0.94 ***
32 CEO Tenure -0.12 + -0.12 + 0.02  0.12 + 0.13 + 0.04  
33 Tenure x Task Challenges 1 -0.01  -0.01  -0.13 + 0.17 * 0.17 * 0.19 ** 
34 Tenure x Task Challenges 2 0.07  0.07  0.06  -0.14 + -0.14 * -0.09  
35 Tenure x Task Challenges 3 -0.04  -0.07  -0.20 ** 0.08  0.05  0.01  
36 Tenure x Task Challenges 4 0.21 ** 0.20 ** -0.02  0.13 + 0.13 + 0.12 + 
37 Tenure x Performance Challenges 1 0.07  0.06  0.01  0.00  -0.02  -0.05  
38 Tenure x Performance Challenges 2 0.16 * 0.13 + -0.17 * 0.26 *** 0.26 *** -0.06  
39 Tenure x CEO Education Level 0.52 *** 0.51 *** 0.05  0.17 * 0.17 * -0.01  
40 Tenure x Age Became CEO -0.07  -0.08  -0.08  0.42 *** 0.43 *** 0.03  
41 Tenure x CEO Incentive Pay -0.13 + -0.12 + 0.03  0.09  0.09  0.61 ***
42 Firm Age -0.13 + -0.14 + -0.13 + 0.19  0.17 * 0.23 ***
43 Firm Size 0.05  0.02  -0.16 * 0.28 *** 0.27 *** 0.15 * 







Table 19 (cont.) 
Correlation Matrix For Independent, Dependent and Control Variables 
  Variable 31   32   33   34   35   
31 CEO Incentive Pay Squared           
32 CEO Tenure 0.03          
33 Tenure x Task Challenges 1 0.15 * 0.21 **       
34 Tenure x Task Challenges 2 -0.07  -0.56 *** -0.25 ***     
35 Tenure x Task Challenges 3 -0.01  0.03  0.09  0.03    
36 Tenure x Task Challenges 4 0.07  0.02  -0.08  0.09  0.00  
37 Tenure x Performance Challenges 1 -0.08  -0.18 * -0.02  0.20 ** 0.11  
38 Tenure x Performance Challenges 2 -0.08  -0.20 ** 0.05  0.16 * 0.23 *** 
39 Tenure x CEO Education Level -0.06  0.75 *** 0.14 + -0.40 *** -0.01  
40 Tenure x Age Became CEO 0.01  0.94 *** 0.24 *** -0.56 *** 0.06  
41 Tenure x CEO Incentive Pay 0.60 *** 0.78 *** 0.28 *** -0.47 *** 0.02  
42 Firm Age 0.23 *** 0.24 *** 0.57 *** -0.35 *** 0.26 *** 
43 Firm Size 0.10  0.28 *** 0.38 *** -0.30 *** 0.22 ** 







Table 19 (cont.) 
Correlation Matrix For Independent, Dependent and Control Variables 
  Variable 36   37   38   39   40   
36 Tenure x Task Challenges 4      
37 Tenure x Performance Challenges 1 -0.03       
38 Tenure x Performance Challenges 2 0.14 * 0.12 +     
39 Tenure x CEO Education Level 0.19 ** -0.09  -0.05    
40 Tenure x Age Became CEO 0.07  -0.17 * -0.07  0.74 ***  
41 Tenure x CEO Incentive Pay 0.07  -0.18 * -0.20 ** 0.55 *** 0.72 *** 
42 Firm Age -0.26 *** -0.12 + 0.01  0.09  0.27 *** 
43 Firm Size 0.14 * -0.01  0.12 + 0.26 *** 0.34 *** 
44 CEO Age 0.05  -0.02  -0.15 * 0.38 *** 0.48 *** 
 
 
Table 19 (cont.) 
Correlation Matrix For Independent, Dependent and Control Variables 
  Variable 41   42   43   
41 Tenure x CEO Incentive Pay        
42 Firm Age 0.35 ***     
43 Firm Size 0.29 *** 0.33 ***   




As a further check against multicolinearity, I evaluated the variance inflation factors 
(VIF) and tolerances as I ran my regressions. All but a few of the VIFs were below the 
generally accepted value of 10 (tolerance 0.10) (Hair et al., 1998) and the majority of 
VIFs were at or below the more conservative value of 2 (tolerance 0.50) (Neter, 
Wasserman & Kutner, 1985). The variables with VIFs above 10 appeared in analysis of 
hypothesis 3 and hypotheses 6 & 7. I will discuss those variables below. 
Hypothesis 1 
 In hypothesis 1, I suggested that job demands would be positively related with 
strategic conformity. This relationship was tested using both the Strategic Conformity 1 
variable (advertising intensity, research and development intensity, selling, general and 
administrative expenses/sales, inventory levels, leverage and equipment newness; 
N=59) and Strategic Conformity 2 (selling, general and administrative expenses/sales, 
inventory levels, leverage and equipment newness; N=200). In testing the Conformity 1 
variable, seen in Table 20, none of the changes in R2 were significant and only  the 
variable testing if the CEO  had prior entrepreneurial experience had a statistically 
significant relationship with conformity. While these results would seem to disconfirm 
the hypothesis, the power of the tests is somewhat problematic.  Using G*Power (Faul, 
Erdfelder, Buchner & Lang, 2009) to test, the smallest change in R2 detectable is 0.18 
for stage 2, 0.14 for stage 3 and 0.18 for stage 4 (p<.05; 1-β=.80). While this does 
mean that while I have enough power to detect what Cohen (1988, 1992) labeled a large 
effect (change in R2 of 0.2595 or greater), I do not have the power to detect a medium or 
lower effect (change in R2 of 0.1304). These power concerns call the meaningfulness of 






Hypothesis 1: Strategic Conformity Regression Results (Conformity 1 Measure) 
Variables Stage 1   Stage 2   Stage 3   Stage 4   VIF Tol 
Firm Size -0.083  0.191  0.222  0.268  4.273 0.234
Firm Age -0.083  0.101  0.097  0.183  2.735 0.366
CEO Age -0.250 * -0.318 * -0.330 * -0.485 * 3.200 0.313
Industry 0.550 *** 0.581 *** 0.587 *** 0.535 *** 1.369 0.730
Task Challenges 1   -0.190  -0.208  -0.229  2.559 0.391
Task Challenges 2   0.189  0.178  0.169  1.650 0.606
Task Challenges 3   -0.242  -0.233  -0.249  2.100 0.476
Task Challenges 4   0.105  0.106  0.132  2.303 0.434
Performance Challenges 1     0.078  0.093  1.266 0.790
Performance Challenges 2     -0.012  0.040  1.537 0.651
CEO Education Level       0.185  1.361 0.735
Entrepreneur CEO       0.326 * 2.152 0.465
Age Became CEO       0.179  3.636 0.275
CEO Incentive Pay       -0.013  1.443 0.693
           
Change in R2 0.334  0.054  0.005  0.077    
F  value  6.78 *** 1.11  0.19  1.61    
Total R2 0.334   0.388   0.393   0.471       
N=59           
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.001 level (two-tailed).        
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed).        
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed).        







Hypothesis 1: Strategic Conformity Regression Results (Conformity 2 Measure) 
Variables Stage 1   Stage 2   Stage 3   Stage 4   VIF Tol 
Firm Size -0.025  0.013  0.027  0.054  2.139 0.467
Firm Age -0.005  -0.037  -0.040  -0.035  1.558 0.642
CEO Age -0.109  -0.106  -0.120  -0.093  2.230 0.448
Industry 0.312 *** 0.263 *** 0.270 *** 0.275 *** 1.386 0.722
Task Challenges 1   0.008  0.000  0.009  1.720 0.581
Task Challenges 2   0.026  -0.002  -0.002  1.513 0.661
Task Challenges 3   0.040  0.034  0.038  1.357 0.737
Task Challenges 4   0.140 + 0.138 + 0.159 + 1.515 0.660
Performance Challenges 1     0.145 * 0.146 * 1.060 0.944
Performance Challenges 2     0.000  0.017  1.362 0.734
CEO Education Level       -0.003  1.126 0.888
Entrepreneur CEO       0.043  1.258 0.795
Age Became CEO       -0.043  2.176 0.460
CEO Incentive Pay       -0.067  1.145 0.873
           
Change in R2 0.123  0.016  0.020  0.008    
F  value  6.84 *** 0.92  2.24 + 0.40    
Total R2 0.123   0.139   0.159   0.167       
N=200           
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.001 level (two-tailed).        
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed).        
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed).        




 Testing hypothesis 1 using the Conformity 2 measure (results found in Table 
21), only the change in R2for stage 3 was marginally supported. Further, a significant 
positive relationship between one of the task challenges factors (p<.10) and one of the 
performance challenges factors (p<.05) providing at least some support for hypotheses 
1, suggesting that elements of the CEOs job/attributes of the organization and demands 
for performance from owners may increase the conformity of an organization’s strategy. 
Hypothesis 2 
 In hypothesis 2, I suggested that job demands would be positively related to 
strategic dynamism, or change in strategy. Much like strategic conformity, this 
relationship was tested using both the Strategic Dynamism 1 variable (advertising 
intensity, research and development intensity, selling, general and administrative 
expenses/sales, inventory levels, leverage and equipment newness; N=54) and Strategic 
Dynamism 2 (selling, general and administrative expenses/sales, inventory levels, 
leverage and equipment newness; N=200). I also planned to also test dynamism through 
number of SIC codes added and dropped by the firm between t and t-1.Data were 
gathered as described in chapter 3 for this third dynamism measure; however, only five 
companies in the sample had added or dropped an SIC code between 2004 and 2005 (as 
can be seen from the histogram below). The variable appeared to have insufficient 





 For the Dynamism 1 measure (results found in Table 22), the change in R2 was 
marginally significant in stage 2 and one of the task challenges factors is significantly 
positively related to strategic dynamism. Therefore there is at least some support for 
hypothesis 2, suggesting that aspects of the CEO’s job increase the change in strategy. 
However, once again there are concerns with regards to the power of the analyses. With 
the sample size, the smallest change in R2 detectable is 0.20 for stage 2, 0.16 for stage 3 
and 0.20 for stage 4 (p<.05; 1-β=.80). It is possible that with more statistical power, 





Hypothesis 2: Strategic Dynamism Regression Results (Dynamism 1 Measure) 
Variables Stage 1   Stage 2   Stage 3   Stage 4   VIF Tol 
Firm Size -0.296 + -0.463 * -0.455 + -0.535 * 4.554 0.220
Firm Age -0.137  -0.248  -0.279  -0.272  2.561 0.390
CEO Age -0.112  0.023  0.017  -0.022  3.595 0.278
Industry -0.273 * -0.255 * -0.262 * -0.289 * 1.339 0.747
Task Challenges 1   0.285  0.323 + 0.265  2.884 0.347
Task Challenges 2   0.171  0.186  0.170  1.869 0.535
Task Challenges 3   0.311 * 0.342 * 0.364 * 2.005 0.499
Task Challenges 4   0.090  0.090  -0.021  2.374 0.421
Performance Challenges 1     0.021  0.004  1.380 0.725
Performance Challenges 2     -0.099  -0.141  1.564 0.639
CEO Education Level       0.180  1.339 0.747
Entrepreneur CEO       -0.099  2.643 0.378
Age Became CEO       -0.006  3.891 0.257
CEO Incentive Pay       0.130  1.691 0.591
           
Change in R2 0.297  0.118  0.007  0.028    
F  value  5.18 *** 2.26 + 0.25  0.49    
Total R2 0.297   0.415   0.422   0.449       
N=54           
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.001 level (two-tailed).        
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed).        
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed).        






Hypothesis 2: Strategic Dynamism Regression Results (Dynamism 2 Measure) 
Variables Stage 1   Stage 2   Stage 3   Stage 4   VIF Tol 
Firm Size -0.180 * -0.207 * -0.198 * -0.187 + 2.136 0.468
Firm Age 0.113  0.066  0.068  0.067  1.514 0.660
CEO Age -0.196 ** -0.115  -0.128 + -0.069  2.208 0.453
Task Challenges 1   0.128  0.123  0.128  1.715 0.583
Task Challenges 2   0.170 * 0.158 * 0.169 * 1.431 0.699
Task Challenges 3   0.113  0.114  0.115  1.355 0.738
Task Challenges 4   0.055  0.056  0.065  1.310 0.763
Performance Challenges 1     0.098  0.095  1.059 0.945
Performance Challenges 2     -0.031  -0.015  1.290 0.775
CEO Education Level       0.002  1.126 0.888
Entrepreneur CEO       -0.047  1.228 0.814
Age Became CEO       -0.091  2.165 0.462
CEO Incentive Pay       0.001  1.145 0.873
           
Change in R2 0.064  0.050  0.010  0.004    
F  value  4.48 ** 2.71 * 1.05  0.23    
Total R2 0.064   0.114   0.124   0.128       
N=200           
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.001 level (two-tailed).        
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed).        
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed).        




 Testing hypothesis 2 with the Dynamism 2 measure (results found in Table 23) 
found similar results to Dynamism 1, that there is a significant change in stage 2 and 
that there is a significantly positive relationship between one of the task challenge 
factors and strategic dynamism. Therefore, there is some support for hypothesis 2, 
suggesting that some elements of the CEO’s job will increase the amount of change in a 
firm’s strategy. 
Hypothesis 3 
 Hypothesis 3 suggested that there would be an inverse-U shaped relationship 
between executive job demands and firm financial performance. In order to test such a 
hypothesis, I included squared terms for all my independent variables in my analyses. 
These squared terms did create some issues with multicollinearity. As seen in Table 24, 
the VIFs for the CEO’s education level, age the individual became CEO and the relative 
amount of incentive pay achieved and their respective squared terms are all very high 
which violates the regression assumption of variables not being perfectly collinear and 
can lead to instability in the regression. The regressions testing Hypothesis 3 were then 
rerun without the squared terms in the equation. Omitting these squared terms lead to 
VIFs within the acceptable range. Because these variables were not added until stage 4, 
in general, the results without the squared terms are the same as those regressions that 
included them. The major difference is that when omitting the squared term  there is no 
relationship between the age the individual became CEO and financial performance but 
there is a significant relationship between the two variables when the squared term is 






VIFs/Tolerances for Hypothesis 3 Regression 
Variables VIF Tol 
Firm Size 2.433 0.411 
Firm Age 1.647 0.607 
CEO Age 2.430 0.412 
Task Challenges 1 2.114 0.473 
Task Challenges 1 Squared 1.604 0.623 
Task Challenges 2 1.599 0.625 
Task Challenges 2 Squared 1.142 0.875 
Task Challenges 3 1.452 0.689 
Task Challenges 3 Squared 1.111 0.900 
Task Challenges 4 2.112 0.474 
Task Challenges 4 Squared 1.737 0.576 
Performance Challenges 1 1.899 0.527 
Performance Challenges 1 Squared 1.800 0.556 
Performance Challenges 2 1.480 0.676 
Performance Challenges 2 Squared 1.349 0.742 
CEO Education Level 60.337 0.017 
CEO Education Level Squared 58.933 0.017 
Entrepreneur CEO 1.425 0.702 
Age Became CEO 152.177 0.007 
Age Became CEO Squared 151.803 0.007 
CEO Incentive Pay 11.213 0.089 
CEO Incentive Pay Squared 11.268 0.089 
 
In examining Hypothesis 3 through ROA (Table 25), only in stage 2 (the 
addition of task challenges) is there a significant increase in R2. Contrary to my 
hypothesis, only one quadratic term is significant and it is in the same direction as the 
unchanged variable. Therefore, with regards to ROA, there is no support for Hypothesis 
3. Somewhat interestingly, there is a significantly negative relationship with regards to 
task challenges and ROA and a positive relationship with performance challenges and 
ROA. This relationship will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5.  
 Tests using ROE (Table 26) did not improve my results. In this analysis, no 





Hypothesis 3: ROA Regression Results 
Variables Stage 1  Stage 2   Stage 3   Stage 4   VIF Tol 
Firm Size 0.075  0.119  0.115  0.093  2.371 0.422
Firm Age -0.043  -0.051  -0.074  -0.074  1.595 0.627
CEO Age -0.018  -0.049  -0.018  0.063  2.311 0.433
Task Challenges 1   -0.136  -0.150  -0.130  2.101 0.476
Task Challenges 1 Squared   0.096  0.059  0.084  1.560 0.641
Task Challenges 2   -0.222 ** -0.257 ** -0.231 ** 1.582 0.632
Task Challenges 2 Squared   -0.157 * -0.155 * -0.164 * 1.108 0.902
Task Challenges 3   0.143 + 0.111  0.118  1.410 0.709
Task Challenges 3 Squared   -0.056  -0.057  -0.065  1.083 0.924
Task Challenges 4   0.118  0.118  0.114  2.087 0.479
Task Challenges 4 Squared   -0.131  -0.134  -0.128  1.716 0.583
Performance Challenges 1     -0.010  -0.026  1.808 0.553
Performance Challenges 1 Squared     0.060  0.038  1.772 0.564
Performance Challenges 2     0.193 ** 0.215 ** 1.449 0.690
Performance Challenges 2 Squared     0.049  0.042  1.346 0.743
CEO Education Level       -0.082  1.145 0.874
Entrepreneur CEO       -0.079  1.330 0.752
Age Became CEO       -0.103  2.230 0.448
CEO Incentive Pay       0.070  1.220 0.820
           
Change in R2 0.006  0.134  0.033  0.017    
F  value  0.39  3.65 *** 1.84  0.97    
Total R2 0.006  0.140   0.173   0.190       





Hypothesis 3: ROE Regression Results  
Variables Stage 1   Stage 2   Stage 3   Stage 4   VIF Tol 
Firm Size 0.149 * 0.003  0.008  0.043  2.371 0.422
Firm Age 0.014  -0.030  -0.037  -0.031  1.595 0.627
CEO Age -0.001  -0.008  0.004  0.023  2.311 0.433
Task Challenges 1   0.073  0.051  0.038  2.101 0.476
Task Challenges 1 Squared   -0.043  -0.064  -0.097  1.560 0.641
Task Challenges 2   -0.161 + -0.177 * -0.188 * 1.582 0.632
Task Challenges 2 Squared   -0.096  -0.094  -0.083  1.108 0.902
Task Challenges 3   0.109  0.092  0.104  1.410 0.709
Task Challenges 3 Squared   -0.043  -0.042  -0.041  1.083 0.924
Task Challenges 4   -0.076  -0.076  -0.052  2.087 0.479
Task Challenges 4 Squared   -0.050  -0.047  -0.067  1.716 0.583
Performance Challenges 1     -0.039  -0.030  1.808 0.553
Performance Challenges 1 Squared     -0.032  -0.018  1.772 0.564
Performance Challenges 2     0.107  0.137  1.449 0.690
Performance Challenges 2 Squared     0.049  0.064  1.346 0.743
CEO Education Level       0.071  1.145 0.874
Entrepreneur CEO       0.116  1.330 0.752
Age Became CEO       -0.050  2.230 0.448
CEO Incentive Pay       -0.034  1.220 0.820
           
Change in R2 0.024  0.058  0.011  0.022    
F  value  1.58  1.48  0.55  1.10    
Total R2 0.024   0.081   0.092   0.114       





Hypothesis 3: ROS Regression Results 
Variables Stage 1  Stage 2   Stage 3   Stage 4   VIF Tol 
Firm Size -0.027  -0.066  -0.069  -0.106  2.371 0.422
Firm Age -0.008  -0.044  -0.060  -0.065  1.595 0.627
CEO Age 0.058  0.011  0.045  0.083  2.311 0.433
Task Challenges 1   0.034  0.013  0.018  2.101 0.476
Task Challenges 1 Squared   0.060  0.023  0.040  1.560 0.641
Task Challenges 2   -0.218 ** -0.250 ** -0.237 ** 1.582 0.632
Task Challenges 2 Squared   -0.248 *** -0.243 *** -0.244 *** 1.108 0.902
Task Challenges 3   0.109  0.078  0.085  1.410 0.709
Task Challenges 3 Squared   0.042  0.043  0.035  1.083 0.924
Task Challenges 4   0.116  0.116  0.084  2.087 0.479
Task Challenges 4 Squared   -0.169 * -0.169 * -0.150 + 1.716 0.583
Performance Challenges 1     -0.039  -0.060  1.808 0.553
Performance Challenges 1 Squared     0.038  0.015  1.772 0.564
Performance Challenges 2     0.198 ** 0.201 * 1.449 0.690
Performance Challenges 2 Squared     0.089  0.077  1.346 0.743
CEO Education Level       -0.036  1.145 0.874
Entrepreneur CEO       -0.068  1.330 0.752
Age Became CEO       -0.047  2.230 0.448
CEO Incentive Pay       0.108  1.220 0.820
           
Change in R2 0.004  0.152  0.038  0.015    
F  value  0.25  4.25 *** 2.18 + 0.84    
Total R2 0.004  0.156   0.195   0.209       





Hypothesis 3: Tobin's Q Regression Results 
Variables Stage 1   Stage 2   Stage 3   Stage 4   VIF Tol 
Firm Size -0.091  0.097  0.069  0.014  2.406 0.416
Firm Age -0.071  0.005  -0.015  -0.023  1.604 0.623
CEO Age -0.070  -0.116 + -0.076  -0.034  2.333 0.429
Industry -0.489 *** -0.462 *** -0.492 *** -0.470 *** 1.435 0.697
Task Challenges 1   -0.264 ** -0.260 ** -0.248 ** 2.114 0.473
Task Challenges 1 Squared   0.022  -0.025  0.007  1.597 0.626
Task Challenges 2   -0.054  -0.065  -0.048  1.629 0.614
Task Challenges 2 Squared   -0.109 + -0.099  -0.104 + 1.108 0.902
Task Challenges 3   -0.076  -0.102  -0.094  1.423 0.703
Task Challenges 3 Squared   -0.010  -0.012  -0.022  1.083 0.924
Task Challenges 4   0.101  0.106  0.060  2.247 0.445
Task Challenges 4 Squared   -0.111  -0.104  -0.079  1.718 0.582
Performance Challenges 1     -0.090  -0.114  1.823 0.549
Performance Challenges 1 Squared     0.101  0.065  1.791 0.558
Performance Challenges 2     0.161 * 0.164 * 1.467 0.682
Performance Challenges 2 Squared     0.033  0.013  1.346 0.743
CEO Education Level       -0.101  1.162 0.861
Entrepreneur CEO       -0.098  1.333 0.750
Age Became CEO       -0.035  2.250 0.444
CEO Incentive Pay       0.137 * 1.228 0.814
           
Change in R2 0.248  0.076  0.046  0.033    
F  value  16.12 *** 2.64 ** 3.31 * 2.47 *   
Total R2 0.248   0.325   0.370   0.403       




factors had any significant relationship with ROE. Again, there is no support for 
hypothesis 3.  
 Testing hypothesis 3 with ROS (Table 27) the results are very similar to that of 
ROA. Again, stage 2 had a significant increase in R2, however, with ROS there is a 
marginally significant change in stage 3. There are also significant negative 
relationships for one of the task challenges factors and its squared term and a significant 
positive relationship with one of the performance challenges. An additional squared task 
challenges term is significantly negatively related to ROS, however, the unsquared term 
is not significant, again disconfirming hypothesis 3.  
Testing hypothesis 3 with Tobin’s Q (Table 28) has similar results to ROA. In 
this analysis, all four stages have a significant change in R2. One of the performance 
challenge factors is significantly negatively related to performance, however, task 
challenges factor 1 is significant in Tobin’s Q while factor 2 has been significant in the 
other performance analyses. Finally with Tobin’s Q, there is a significant positive 
relationship between performance and the relative amount of incentive pay achieved, 
however given the importance of market return on Tobin’s Q and a connection between 
the incentive pay a CEO receives and the firm’s market performance, this relationship 
may be spurious.   
Taken together, given that in the single situation where a variable and its 
squared term were significant they were both in the negative, hypothesis 3 is not 
confirmed through the tests of ROA, ROE, ROS and Tobin’s Q. In doing power 
analysis, the smallest change in R2 detectable is 0.07 for stage 2, 0.06 for stage 3 and 




or less) suggested by Cohen (1988, 1992), it is still lower than his suggested medium 
effect (change in R2 of 0.1304) the limit and therefore while more powerful inferences 
could be made, there is still reasonably high power and these nonsignificant findings 
may still suggest no relationship. 
Hypothesis 4 
 Hypothesis 4 suggested that as demands increase the performance of the firm 
would behave more erratically and performance variability would increase. Again this 
was tested with four measures of performance, ROA, ROE, ROS and Tobin’s Q. 
Testing this hypothesis with ROA (Table 29), only stage 2 had a significant increase in 
R2. In this stage, only one of the task challenge factors was significantly positively 
related to variability in ROA. This relationship became only marginally significant as 
more predictors were added. A performance challenge factor was also marginally 
positively significant.  
Testing through ROE (Table 30) gives very similar results in that the same task 
challenge and performance challenge factors with marginal significance in the ROA 
regressions both are positively significantly related to performance variability. In this 
analysis, both   stage 2 and stage 3 have statistically significant increases in explanatory 
power for performance variability.  
The results from ROS (Table 31) are somewhat different from the other 
analyses. Once again, stage 2 and 3 have a significant increase in R2. The same 
performance challenge factor is significantly positively related to performance 





Hypothesis 4: Performance Variability (ROA) Regression Results 
Variables Stage 1   Stage 2   Stage 3   Stage 4   VIF Tol 
Firm Size -0.210 ** -0.185 * -0.163 + -0.166 + 2.277 0.439
Firm Age -0.234 *** -0.210 ** -0.212 ** -0.214 ** 2.212 0.452
CEO Age 0.018  0.090  0.076  0.055  1.524 0.656
Industry -0.312 *** -0.282 *** -0.254 *** -0.257 *** 1.277 0.783
Task Challenges 1   -0.113  -0.132  -0.131  1.908 0.524
Task Challenges 2   0.103  0.077  0.075  1.434 0.697
Task Challenges 3   0.145 * 0.138 + 0.129 + 1.356 0.737
Task Challenges 4   -0.067  -0.069  -0.067  1.310 0.763
Performance Challenges 1     0.118 + 0.119 + 1.128 0.886
Performance Challenges 2     0.017  0.004  1.294 0.773
CEO Education Level       -0.012  1.147 0.872
Entrepreneur CEO       -0.029  1.228 0.814
Age Became CEO       0.037  2.184 0.458
CEO Incentive Pay       -0.022  1.147 0.871
           
Change in R2 0.206  0.040  0.013  0.003    
F  value  12.68 *** 2.53 * 1.67  0.17    
Total R2 0.206   0.246   0.259   0.262       
N=200           
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.001 level (two-tailed).        
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed).        
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed).        







Hypothesis 4: Performance Variability (ROE) Regression Results 
Variables Stage 1   Stage 2   Stage 3   Stage 4   VIF Tol 
Firm Size -0.123 + -0.106  -0.086  -0.066  2.136 0.468
Firm Age -0.065  -0.091  -0.080  -0.081  1.514 0.660
CEO Age -0.083  -0.002  -0.036  -0.050  2.208 0.453
Task Challenges 1   -0.029  -0.040  -0.045  1.715 0.583
Task Challenges 2   0.115  0.095  0.090  1.431 0.699
Task Challenges 3   0.170 * 0.178 * 0.173 * 1.355 0.738
Task Challenges 4   0.038  0.043  0.044  1.310 0.763
Performance Challenges 1     0.223 * 0.221 ** 1.059 0.945
Performance Challenges 2     -0.111  -0.126  1.290 0.775
CEO Education Level       0.063  1.126 0.888
Entrepreneur CEO       -0.014  1.228 0.814
Age Became CEO       0.005  2.165 0.462
CEO Incentive Pay       -0.044  1.145 0.873
           
Change in R2 0.035  0.040  0.055  0.006    
F  value  2.37 + 2.07 * 6.00 ** 0.31    
Total R2 0.035   0.075   0.130   0.136       
N=200           
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.001 level (two-tailed).        
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed).        
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed).        





Hypothesis 4: Performance Variability (ROS) Regression Results 
Variables Stage 1   Stage 2   Stage 3   Stage 4   VIF Tol 
Firm Size -0.353 *** -0.155 + -0.138  -0.125  2.226 0.449
Firm Age -0.170 ** -0.159 * -0.142 + -0.143 + 1.547 0.647
CEO Age -0.044  0.018  -0.012  -0.004  2.324 0.430
Industry 0.008  -0.073  -0.096  -0.102  1.223 0.818
Task Challenges 1   -0.153 + -0.160 * -0.152 + 1.745 0.573
Task Challenges 2   0.227 ** 0.232 ** 0.238 *** 1.465 0.683
Task Challenges 3   0.079  0.090  0.076  1.369 0.730
Task Challenges 4   0.208 ** 0.220 *** 0.243 *** 1.406 0.711
Performance Challenges 1     0.128 * 0.131 * 1.059 0.944
Performance Challenges 2     -0.123 + -0.127 + 1.344 0.744
CEO Education Level       -0.047  1.126 0.888
Entrepreneur CEO       -0.061  1.228 0.814
Age Became CEO       -0.004  2.187 0.457
CEO Incentive Pay       -0.070  1.151 0.868
           
Change in R2 0.199  0.094  0.027  0.099    
F  value  12.14 *** 6.32 *** 3.70 * 0.65    
Total R2 0.199   0.293   0.320   0.329       
N=200           
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.001 level (two-tailed).        
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed).        
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed).        






Hypothesis 4: Performance Variability (Tobin's Q) Regression Results 
Variables Stage 1   Stage 2   Stage 3   Stage 4   VIF Tol 
Firm Size -0.212 *** -0.056  -0.063  -0.117  2.163 0.462
Firm Age -0.175 ** -0.112 + -0.117 + -0.128 * 1.530 0.654
CEO Age -0.029  -0.072  -0.059  -0.023  2.228 0.449
Industry -0.606 *** -0.599 *** -0.606 *** -0.593 *** 1.383 0.723
Task Challenges 1   -0.233 *** -0.229 *** -0.239 *** 1.743 0.574
Task Challenges 2   -0.032  -0.028  -0.017  1.491 0.670
Task Challenges 3   -0.101 + -0.108 + -0.102 + 1.364 0.733
Task Challenges 4   0.053  0.054  0.008  1.476 0.678
Performance Challenges 1     -0.074  -0.078  1.091 0.917
Performance Challenges 2     0.058  0.066  1.318 0.759
CEO Education Level       -0.022  1.138 0.879
Entrepreneur CEO       -0.091  1.237 0.808
Age Became CEO       -0.043  2.177 0.459
CEO Incentive Pay       0.189 *** 1.152 0.868
           
Change in R2 0.431  0.043  0.008  0.039    
F  value  36.99 *** 3.88 ** 1.38  3.76 **   
Total R2 0.431   0.474   0.482   0.521       
N=200           
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.001 level (two-tailed).        
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed).        
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed).        





positively related no longer has a significant relationship. Despite this change, two other 
of the task challenge factors are significantly positively related to performance 
variability. Surprisingly, the fourth task challenge factor and the other performance 
challenge factor are negatively related to variability, even if only marginally so. This 
somewhat surprising finding will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5. Finally, 
testing hypothesis 4 with Tobin’s Q (Table 32) had equally surprising results. Stage 2 
and 4 both had significant increases in R2. However, while all of the previous analyses 
had shown a significant and positive relationship between task challenges and 
performance variability, this analysis shows a significant and negative relationship 
between one of the  task challenge factors and variability (with an additional task 
challenge factor negatively marginally significant). This surprising relationship will also 
be discussed in Chapter 5. In addition to this finding, CEO incentive pay was 
significantly positively related to performance variability. While this does fit the 
hypothesis, the fact that it is the only executive aspiration factor in all four tests of 
performance variability to be significant may be again connected to a relationship 
between incentive pay and Tobin’s Q outside of any relationship related to demands.  
Hypothesis 5 a-b 
 Hypotheses 5a and b suggests that the relationship between demands and firm 
performance would be mediated through Strategic Conformity and Strategic Dynamism. 
To test this hypothesis, I first tested the relationship between my measures of demands 
and financial performance (stage 2). I then tested the relationships between conformity 
and performance as well as dynamism and performance (stage 3). Finally I tested the 







Hypothesis 5a: ROA Mediated through Conformity (Conformity 1)  Regression Results 
Variables Stage 1   Stage 2   Stage 3   Stage 4   VIF Tol 
Firm Size -0.053  -0.015  -0.064  -0.022  4.194 0.238
Firm Age -0.038  -0.224  -0.032  -0.249  2.719 0.368
CEO Age -0.116  0.080  -0.127  0.101  3.253 0.307
Task Challenges 1   -0.262    -0.243  2.658 0.376
Task Challenges 2   -0.546 ***  -0.558 *** 1.697 0.589
Task Challenges 3   0.057   0.065  2.051 0.488
Task Challenges 4   0.034   0.031  2.277 0.439
Performance Challenges 1   -0.111   -0.114  1.260 0.793
Performance Challenges 2   0.276 +  0.273 + 1.540 0.649
CEO Education Level   -0.141    -0.158  1.424 0.702
Entrepreneur CEO   -0.243    -0.263  2.298 0.435
Age Became CEO   -0.241    -0.244  3.565 0.281
CEO Incentive Pay   -0.091    -0.087  1.437 0.696
Conformity     -0.053      
Conformity (Mediated)       0.062  1.354 0.739
           
Change in R2 0.021  0.398  0.003  0.003    
F  value  0.40  2.94 ** 0.14  0.21    
Total R2 0.021   0.408   0.024   0.411       
N=59           
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.001 level (two-tailed).        
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed).        
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed).        







Hypothesis 5a: ROE Mediated through Conformity (Conformity 1)  Regression Results 
Variables Stage 1  Stage 2   Stage 3  Stage 4   VIF Tol 
Firm Size 0.149  -0.068  0.154  -0.084  4.194 0.238
Firm Age 0.058  -0.204  0.055  -0.257  2.719 0.368
CEO Age -0.165  0.222  -0.161  0.266  3.253 0.307
Task Challenges 1   0.219    0.259  2.658 0.376
Task Challenges 2   -0.392 *  -0.417 * 1.697 0.589
Task Challenges 3   0.152   0.169  2.051 0.488
Task Challenges 4   -0.075   -0.082  2.277 0.439
Performance Challenges 1   -0.138   -0.144  1.260 0.793
Performance Challenges 2   0.246   0.237  1.540 0.649
CEO Education Level   -0.067    -0.103  1.424 0.702
Entrepreneur CEO   -0.197    -0.240  2.298 0.435
Age Became CEO   -0.416 +   -0.423 + 3.565 0.281
CEO Incentive Pay   -0.220    -0.212  1.437 0.696
Conformity     0.021      
Conformity (Mediated)       0.131  1.354 0.739
           
Change in R2 0.058  0.281  0.000  0.013    
F  value  1.13  1.92 + 0.02  0.86    
Total R2 0.058  0.339   0.058  0.352       
N=59           
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.001 level (two-tailed).        
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed).        
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed).        







Hypothesis 5a: ROS Mediated through Conformity (Conformity 1)  Regression Results 
Variables Stage 1   Stage 2   Stage 3   Stage 4   VIF Tol 
Firm Size -0.019  -0.012  -0.035  -0.019  4.194 0.238
Firm Age -0.089  -0.382 * -0.080  -0.404 * 2.719 0.368
CEO Age 0.005  0.122  -0.010  0.141  3.253 0.307
Task Challenges 1   -0.119    -0.102  2.658 0.376
Task Challenges 2   -0.574 ***  -0.584 *** 1.697 0.589
Task Challenges 3   0.165   0.172  2.051 0.488
Task Challenges 4   0.149   0.146  2.277 0.439
Performance Challenges 1   -0.039   -0.042  1.260 0.793
Performance Challenges 2   0.208   0.204  1.540 0.649
CEO Education Level   -0.123    -0.139  1.424 0.702
Entrepreneur CEO   -0.185    -0.203  2.298 0.435
Age Became CEO   -0.121    -0.124  3.565 0.281
CEO Incentive Pay   -0.054    -0.051  1.437 0.696
Conformity     -0.069      
Conformity (Mediated)       0.056  1.354 0.739
           
Change in R2 0.010  0.367  0.004  0.002    
F  value  0.18  2.65 * 0.25  0.16    
Total R2 0.010   0.377   0.014   0.379       
N=59           
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.001 level (two-tailed).        
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed).        
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed).        







Hypothesis 5a: Tobin's Q Mediated through Conformity (Conformity 1)  Regression Results 
Variables Stage 1   Stage 2   Stage 3   Stage 4   VIF Tol 
Firm Size -0.160  0.265  -0.190  0.272  4.194 0.238
Firm Age -0.157  -0.081  -0.139  -0.061  2.719 0.368
CEO Age -0.166  -0.061  -0.196  -0.078  3.253 0.307
Task Challenges 1   -0.494 **   -0.510 ** 2.658 0.376
Task Challenges 2   -0.196   -0.186  1.697 0.589
Task Challenges 3   -0.345 *  -0.352 * 2.051 0.488
Task Challenges 4   0.258 +  0.261 + 2.277 0.439
Performance Challenges 1   -0.211 +  -0.208 + 1.260 0.793
Performance Challenges 2   0.173   0.176  1.540 0.649
CEO Education Level   -0.241 *   -0.227 + 1.424 0.702
Entrepreneur CEO   -0.385 *   -0.368 * 2.298 0.435
Age Became CEO   -0.236    -0.234  3.565 0.281
CEO Incentive Pay   -0.057    -0.060  1.437 0.696
Conformity     -0.137      
Conformity (Mediated)       -0.051  1.354 0.739
           
Change in R2 0.112  0.428  0.017  0.002    
F  value  2.31 + 4.19 *** 1.08  0.18    
Total R2 0.112   0.540   0.129   0.542       
N=59           
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.001 level (two-tailed).        
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed).        
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed).        







Hypothesis 5a: ROA Mediated through Conformity (Conformity 2)  Regression Results 
Variables Stage 1   Stage 2   Stage 3   Stage 4   VIF Tol 
Firm Size 0.075  0.040  0.065  0.047  2.141 0.467
Firm Age -0.043  -0.105  -0.036  -0.104  1.514 0.660
CEO Age -0.018  0.006  -0.039  -0.007  2.226 0.449
Task Challenges 1   -0.167 +   -0.168 + 1.715 0.583
Task Challenges 2   -0.287 ***  -0.280 *** 1.436 0.696
Task Challenges 3   0.100   0.103  1.356 0.737
Task Challenges 4   0.030   0.058  1.389 0.720
Performance Challenges 1   -0.088   -0.073  1.080 0.926
Performance Challenges 2   0.199 **  0.195 * 1.293 0.774
CEO Education Level   -0.062    -0.063  1.126 0.888
Entrepreneur CEO   -0.053    -0.053  1.228 0.814
Age Became CEO   -0.060    -0.067  2.170 0.461
CEO Incentive Pay   0.103    0.096  1.151 0.869
Conformity     -0.125 +     
Conformity (Mediated)       -0.107  1.126 0.888
           
Change in R2 0.006  0.144  0.015  0.010    
F  value  0.39  3.15 *** 3.01 + 2.23    
Total R2 0.006   0.150   0.021   0.160       
N=200           
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.001 level (two-tailed).        
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed).        
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed).        







Hypothesis 5a: ROE Mediated through Conformity (Conformity 2)  Regression Results 
Variables Stage 1  Stage 2   Stage 3   Stage 4   VIF Tol 
Firm Size 0.149  0.008  0.138  0.014  2.141 0.467
Firm Age 0.014  -0.035  0.021  -0.033  1.514 0.660
CEO Age -0.001  0.003  -0.021  -0.009  2.226 0.449
Task Challenges 1   0.089    0.089  1.715 0.583
Task Challenges 2   -0.203 *  -0.197 * 1.436 0.696
Task Challenges 3   0.108   0.111  1.356 0.737
Task Challenges 4   -0.112   -0.088  1.389 0.720
Performance Challenges 1   -0.040   -0.027  1.080 0.926
Performance Challenges 2   0.093   0.089  1.293 0.774
CEO Education Level   0.074    0.073  1.126 0.888
Entrepreneur CEO   0.098    0.099  1.228 0.814
Age Became CEO   -0.038    -0.044  2.170 0.461
CEO Incentive Pay   -0.019    -0.025  1.151 0.869
Conformity     -0.120 +     
Conformity (Mediated)       -0.091  1.126 0.888
           
Change in R2 0.024  0.068  0.014  0.007    
F  value  1.58  1.40  2.82 + 1.50    
Total R2 0.024  0.092   0.038   0.099       
N=200           
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.001 level (two-tailed).        
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed).        
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed).        







Hypothesis 5a: ROS Mediated through Conformity (Conformity 2)  Regression Results 
Variables Stage 1  Stage 2   Stage 3   Stage 4   VIF Tol 
Firm Size -0.027  -0.198 * -0.040  -0.191 + 2.141 0.467
Firm Age -0.008  -0.114  0.000  -0.113  1.514 0.660
CEO Age 0.058  0.028  0.033  0.014  2.226 0.449
Task Challenges 1   0.022    0.021  1.715 0.583
Task Challenges 2   -0.317 ***  -0.309 *** 1.436 0.696
Task Challenges 3   0.087   0.091  1.356 0.737
Task Challenges 4   -0.028   0.002  1.389 0.720
Performance Challenges 1   -0.125 +  -0.110  1.080 0.926
Performance Challenges 2   0.170 *  0.165 * 1.293 0.774
CEO Education Level   -0.012    -0.013  1.126 0.888
Entrepreneur CEO   -0.044    -0.044  1.228 0.814
Age Became CEO   0.003    -0.005  2.170 0.461
CEO Incentive Pay   0.158 *   0.150 * 1.151 0.869
Conformity     -0.150 *     
Conformity (Mediated)       -0.112  1.126 0.888
           
Change in R2 0.004  0.137  0.022  0.011    
F  value  0.25  2.96 ** 4.34 * 2.42    
Total R2 0.004  0.141   0.026   0.152       
N=200           
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.001 level (two-tailed).        
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed).        
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed).        







Hypothesis 5a: Tobin's Q Mediated through Conformity (Conformity 2)  Regression Results 
Variables Stage 1   Stage 2   Stage 3   Stage 4   VIF Tol 
Firm Size -0.091  -0.018  -0.098  -0.007  2.171 0.461
Firm Age -0.071  -0.037  -0.067  -0.036  1.530 0.654
CEO Age -0.070  -0.065  -0.094  -0.079  2.243 0.446
Industry -0.489 *** -0.463 *** -0.466 *** -0.449 *** 1.397 0.716
Task Challenges 1   -0.260 ***   -0.263 *** 1.744 0.573
Task Challenges 2   -0.079   -0.074  1.493 0.670
Task Challenges 3   -0.098   -0.093  1.366 0.732
Task Challenges 4   0.002   0.031  1.534 0.652
Performance Challenges 1   -0.169 **  -0.149 * 1.119 0.894
Performance Challenges 2   0.149 *  0.146 * 1.319 0.758
CEO Education Level   -0.093    -0.096  1.138 0.879
Entrepreneur CEO   -0.093    -0.092  1.237 0.808
Age Became CEO   -0.016    -0.026  2.184 0.458
CEO Incentive Pay   0.162 **   0.154 * 1.156 0.865
Conformity     -0.155 *     
Conformity (Mediated)       -0.128 * 1.137 0.879
           
Change in R2 0.25  0.14  0.02  0.02    
F  value  16.118 *** 4.209 *** 6.076 * 4.466 *   
Total R2 0.248   0.388   0.271   0.402       





stage 2 were reduced (partially mediated) or eliminated (fully mediated) with the 
inclusion of conformity/dynamism (Baron & Kenny, 1986). 
Using the Conformity 1 measure (Tables 33-36), I found no support for 
hypothesis 5a. There was no significant relationship found between conformity and any 
of the measures of performance (ROA, ROE, ROS and Tobin’s Q). Again, there are 
power concerns as to the veracity of this non-relationship. The smallest changes in R2 
detectable are 0.12 in stages 3 and 4. While this is smaller than a medium effect 
(0.1304), it isn’t by much. While no relationship is detected, it may still possible that 
such a relationship exists. 
 To further test such I relationship, I next looked at the Conformity 2 measure. 
The results in these analyses (Tables 37-40), also do not provide much support for the 
hypothesis. Evaluating Hypothesis 5a with ROA and ROE (Tables 37 and 38), 
conformity only marginally significantly affects performance by itself. This marginal 
relationship is not present in the full model in stage 4 and the standardized betas and 
significance of the demands variables are not affected by much if at all. ROS (Table 39) 
still does not show much support. Conformity, by itself, is significant at the p < 0.05 
level, but again this relationship is not present in the full model and again there is no 
real affect on standardized betas or significance for the demands variables. Tobin’s Q 
(Table 40) does provide some possibility for support. Conformity does remain 
significant in the full model, however, there is not a particularly large change (if any 
change exists) in standardized betas or significance of the demands variables. The 
power observed is fairly reasonable in that smallest changes in R2 detectable are 0.04 in 






Hypothesis 5b: ROA Mediated through Dynamism (Dynamism 1)  Regression Results 
Variables Stage 1   Stage 2   Stage 3   Stage 4   VIF Tol 
Firm Size 0.035  0.270  -0.107  0.071  5.019 0.199
Firm Age 0.060  -0.032  0.035  -0.099  2.597 0.385
CEO Age -0.146  0.142  -0.192  0.121  3.568 0.280
Task Challenges 1   -0.375 +   -0.288  3.011 0.332
Task Challenges 2   -0.346 +  -0.298 + 1.906 0.525
Task Challenges 3   0.058   0.167  2.217 0.451
Task Challenges 4   0.214   0.219  2.354 0.425
Performance Challenges 1   -0.004   -0.008  1.374 0.728
Performance Challenges 2   0.233   0.198  1.576 0.635
CEO Education Level   -0.227    -0.180  1.369 0.730
Entrepreneur CEO   -0.339    -0.354 + 2.609 0.383
Age Became CEO   -0.315    -0.301  3.849 0.260
CEO Incentive Pay   -0.144    -0.127  1.610 0.621
Dynamism     -0.330 *     
Dynamism (Mediated)       -0.302 + 1.632 0.613
           
Change in R2 0.025  0.313  0.083  0.056    
F  value  0.43  1.89 + 4.57 * 3.60 +   
Total R2 0.025   0.338   0.108   0.394       
N=54           
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.001 level (two-tailed).        
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed).        
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed).        






Hypothesis 5b: ROE Mediated through Dynamism (Dynamism 1)  Regression Results 
Variables Stage 1   Stage 2   Stage 3   Stage 4  VIF Tol 
Firm Size 0.170  0.118  0.162  0.117  5.019 0.199
Firm Age 0.144  0.002  0.143  0.001  2.597 0.385
CEO Age -0.242 + 0.054  -0.244 + 0.053  3.568 0.280
Task Challenges 1   0.056    0.057  3.011 0.332
Task Challenges 2   -0.204   -0.204  1.906 0.525
Task Challenges 3   0.094   0.095  2.217 0.451
Task Challenges 4   0.054   0.054  2.354 0.425
Performance Challenges 1   -0.059   -0.059  1.374 0.728
Performance Challenges 2   0.232   0.232  1.576 0.635
CEO Education Level   -0.159    -0.159  1.369 0.730
Entrepreneur CEO   -0.146    -0.146  2.609 0.383
Age Became CEO   -0.265    -0.265  3.849 0.260
CEO Incentive Pay   -0.153    -0.153  1.610 0.621
Dynamism     -0.018      
Dynamism (Mediated)       -0.002  1.632 0.613
           
Change in R2 0.121  0.114  0.000  0.000    
F  value  2.29 + 0.59  0.01  0.00    
Total R2 0.121   0.235   0.121   0.235      
N=54           
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.001 level (two-tailed).        
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed).        
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed).        






Hypothesis 5b: ROS Mediated through Dynamism (Dynamism 1)  Regression Results 
Variables Stage 1   Stage 2   Stage 3   Stage 4   VIF Tol 
Firm Size 0.066  0.204  -0.017  0.057  5.019 0.199
Firm Age -0.023  -0.234  -0.038  -0.283  2.597 0.385
CEO Age 0.021  0.182  -0.006  0.167  3.568 0.280
Task Challenges 1   -0.201    -0.137  3.011 0.332
Task Challenges 2   -0.360 +  -0.326 + 1.906 0.525
Task Challenges 3   0.184   0.265  2.217 0.451
Task Challenges 4   0.303   0.306  2.354 0.425
Performance Challenges 1   0.054   0.050  1.374 0.728
Performance Challenges 2   0.133   0.107  1.576 0.635
CEO Education Level   -0.166    -0.132  1.369 0.730
Entrepreneur CEO   -0.296    -0.307  2.609 0.383
Age Became CEO   -0.141    -0.130  3.849 0.260
CEO Incentive Pay   -0.047    -0.034  1.610 0.621
Dynamism     -0.192      
Dynamism (Mediated)       -0.223  1.632 0.613
           
Change in R2 0.004  0.296  0.028  0.030    
F  value  0.06  1.69  1.42  1.77    
Total R2 0.004   0.300   0.032   0.330       
N=54           
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.001 level (two-tailed).        
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed).        
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed).        






Hypothesis 5b: Tobin's Q Mediated through Dynamism (Dynamism 1)  Regression Results 
Variables Stage 1  Stage 2   Stage 3   Stage 4   VIF Tol 
Firm Size -0.107  0.190  -0.212  0.137  5.019 0.199
Firm Age -0.136  -0.045  -0.154  -0.063  2.597 0.385
CEO Age -0.157  0.118  -0.191  0.112  3.568 0.280
Task Challenges 1   -0.593 **   -0.569 ** 3.011 0.332
Task Challenges 2   -0.202    -0.189  1.906 0.525
Task Challenges 3   -0.309 *   -0.280 + 2.217 0.451
Task Challenges 4   0.180    0.181  2.354 0.425
Performance Challenges 1   -0.264 *   -0.265 * 1.374 0.728
Performance Challenges 2   0.188    0.178  1.576 0.635
CEO Education Level   -0.157    -0.144  1.369 0.730
Entrepreneur CEO   -0.655 ***   -0.659 *** 2.609 0.383
Age Became CEO   -0.447 *   -0.443 * 3.849 0.260
CEO Incentive Pay   0.082    0.086  1.610 0.621
Dynamism     -0.245      
Dynamism (Mediated)       -0.081  1.632 0.613
           
Change in R2 0.074  0.490  0.046  0.004    
F  value  1.33  4.49 *** 2.56  0.36    
Total R2 0.074  0.563   0.120   0.567       
N=54           
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.001 level (two-tailed).        
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed).        
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed).        






Hypothesis 5b: ROA Mediated through Dynamism (Dynamism 2)  Regression Results 
Variables Stage 1  Stage 2   Stage 3   Stage 4   VIF Tol 
Firm Size 0.075  0.040  0.040  0.012  2.176 0.460
Firm Age -0.043  -0.105  -0.021  -0.095  1.519 0.658
CEO Age -0.018  0.006  -0.056  -0.004  2.213 0.452
Task Challenges 1   -0.167 +   -0.148 + 1.734 0.577
Task Challenges 2   -0.287 ***   -0.262 *** 1.464 0.683
Task Challenges 3   0.100    0.117  1.370 0.730
Task Challenges 4   0.030    0.039  1.315 0.761
Performance Challenges 1   -0.088    -0.074  1.069 0.935
Performance Challenges 2   0.199 **   0.197 * 1.290 0.775
CEO Education Level   -0.062    -0.062  1.126 0.888
Entrepreneur CEO   -0.053    -0.060  1.230 0.813
Age Became CEO   -0.060    -0.073  2.174 0.460
CEO Incentive Pay   0.103    0.103  1.145 0.873
Dynamism     -0.192 **     
Dynamism (Mediated)       -0.149 * 1.147 0.872
           
Change in R2 0.006  0.144  0.035  0.019    
F  value  0.39  3.15 *** 7.04 ** 4.30 *   
Total R2 0.006  0.150   0.041   0.169       
N=200           
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.001 level (two-tailed).        
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed).        
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed).        






Hypothesis 5b: ROE Mediated through Dynamism (Dynamism 2)  Regression Results 
Variables Stage 1   Stage 2   Stage 3   Stage 4   VIF Tol 
Firm Size 0.149 * 0.008  0.137 + 0.000  2.176 0.460
Firm Age 0.014  -0.035  0.022  -0.031  1.519 0.658
CEO Age -0.001  0.003  -0.015  -0.001  2.213 0.452
Task Challenges 1   0.089    0.095  1.734 0.577
Task Challenges 2   -0.203 *   -0.195 * 1.464 0.683
Task Challenges 3   0.108    0.114  1.370 0.730
Task Challenges 4   -0.112    -0.109  1.315 0.761
Performance Challenges 1   -0.040    -0.035  1.069 0.935
Performance Challenges 2   0.093    0.093  1.290 0.775
CEO Education Level   0.074    0.074  1.126 0.888
Entrepreneur CEO   0.098    0.096  1.230 0.813
Age Became CEO   -0.038    -0.042  2.174 0.460
CEO Incentive Pay   -0.019    -0.019  1.145 0.873
Dynamism     -0.066      
Dynamism (Mediated)       -0.047  1.147 0.872
           
Change in R2 0.024  0.068  0.004  0.002    
F  value  1.58  1.40  0.83  0.39    
Total R2 0.024   0.092   0.028   0.094       
N=200           
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.001 level (two-tailed).        
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed).        
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed).        






Hypothesis 5b: ROS Mediated through Dynamism (Dynamism 2)  Regression Results 
Variables Stage 1   Stage 2   Stage 3   Stage 4   VIF Tol 
Firm Size -0.027  -0.198 * -0.067  -0.233 * 2.176 0.460
Firm Age -0.008  -0.114  0.017  -0.102  1.519 0.658
CEO Age 0.058  0.028  0.014  0.015  2.213 0.452
Task Challenges 1   0.022    0.046  1.734 0.577
Task Challenges 2   -0.317 ***  -0.285 *** 1.464 0.683
Task Challenges 3   0.087   0.109  1.370 0.730
Task Challenges 4   -0.028   -0.016  1.315 0.761
Performance Challenges 1   -0.125 +  -0.108  1.069 0.935
Performance Challenges 2   0.170 *  0.167 * 1.290 0.775
CEO Education Level   -0.012    -0.012  1.126 0.888
Entrepreneur CEO   -0.044    -0.053  1.230 0.813
Age Became CEO   0.003    -0.014  2.174 0.460
CEO Incentive Pay   0.158 *   0.158 * 1.145 0.873
Dynamism     -0.224 **     
Dynamism (Mediated)       -0.186 ** 1.147 0.872
           
Change in R2 0.004  0.137  0.047  0.030    
F  value  0.25  2.96 ** 9.63 ** 6.73 **   
Total R2 0.004   0.141   0.051   0.171       
N=200           
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.001 level (two-tailed).        
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed).        
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed).        






Hypothesis 5b: Tobin's Q Mediated through Dynamism (Dynamism 2)  Regression Results 
Variables Stage 1   Stage 2   Stage 3   Stage 4   VIF Tol 
Firm Size -0.091  -0.018  -0.119  -0.037  2.207 0.453
Firm Age -0.071  -0.037  -0.053  -0.029  1.536 0.651
CEO Age -0.070  -0.065  -0.100  -0.072  2.235 0.447
Industry -0.489 *** -0.463 *** -0.492 *** -0.470 *** 1.388 0.720
Task Challenges 1   -0.260 ***   -0.246 *** 1.765 0.567
Task Challenges 2   -0.079    -0.061  1.530 0.654
Task Challenges 3   -0.098    -0.087  1.378 0.726
Task Challenges 4   0.002    0.010  1.485 0.674
Performance Challenges 1   -0.169 **   -0.161 ** 1.099 0.910
Performance Challenges 2   0.149 *   0.147 * 1.319 0.758
CEO Education Level   -0.093    -0.093  1.138 0.879
Entrepreneur CEO   -0.093    -0.099  1.240 0.806
Age Became CEO   -0.016    -0.025  2.185 0.458
CEO Incentive Pay   0.162 **   0.162 ** 1.152 0.868
Dynamism     -0.155 *     
Dynamism (Mediated)       -0.100  1.151 0.869
           
Change in R2 0.248  0.139  0.022  0.009    
F  value  16.12 *** 4.21 *** 5.98 * 2.62    
Total R2 0.248   0.388   0.271   0.396       




Hypothesis 5b looks at whether the relationship between job demands and 
performance is mediated through strategic dynamism. The strategic dynamism 1 
measure, like the strategic conformity 1 measure, does not provide much support for the 
hypothesis. There is no significance for the dynamism measure on ROE, ROS or 
Tobin’s Q (Tables 42-44). ROA (Table 41) provides some evidence, but still not 
significant findings. Dynamism does significantly impact ROA by itself; however, that 
significance drops to p<0.10 level in the complete model. Further, there are no 
significant relationships (at the p<0.05 level) between demands and ROA to mediate. 
However, it may be illustrative to look at the marginally significant results. Two of the 
task challenges factors were marginally significant (at the p<0.10) level in stage 2, but 
when dynamism was included, one lost even that marginal significance and the other’s 
standardized beta was reduced. While this does not provide supportable results, it does 
give some indication that a relationship may exist, especially given the power 
considerations (the smallest change in R2 detectable is again 0.12 in stages 3 and 4). 
Testing using the dynamism 2 measure does seem to provide more support. 
ROE and Tobin’s Q (Tables 46 and 48, respectively) did not give any support for this 
hypothesis. Dynamism was not significantly related to ROE in either stage. There was a 
significant relationship with Tobin’s Q alone, but that relationship was reduced to 
nonsignificance in the full model and the standardized betas were not affected. ROA 
(Table 45) does seem to provide at least some support for the hypothesis. Dynamism 
significantly affects ROA in both stage 3 and 4, and the standardized betas for two task 
challenge factors (the same two in the dynamism 1 regression) did go down.  ROS 




the full model. Further, the standardized beta for the significant task challenge factor 
does go down (there is a significant performance challenge factor, but its standardized 
beta is not particularly affected by dynamism). While the hypothesis is not supported in 
that there is not full mediation, there is some support for dynamism partially mediating 
the relationship between demands and performance. 
Hypothesis 6 a-b and 7 a-b 
 Hypotheses 6 a-b suggested that CEO Tenure would have a relationship with 
strategic conformity and strategic dynamism. This relationship was further expected to 
be stronger as job demands increase (proposed as Hypotheses 7 a-b). Before testing 
these hypothesis, I must first address an issue with multicollinearity. In initial 
regressions for these hypotheses, the VIF/Tolerances were well beyond the 10/0.1 
threshold that even liberal  rules of thumb find acceptable for the  CEO Tenure and the 
interaction effect between CEO Tenure and the age the individual became a CEO 
variables (seen in Table  49). CEO tenure is vital to the analysis, so that variable cannot 
be dropped. Therefore, the tests were run omitting the interaction variable of CEO 
Tenure and the age the individual became a CEO. While the VIF/Tolerances were still 
above the conservative threshold of 2 (and slightly above the more liberal threshold of 
10 in one case) in the full models, the key test really exists in the stage 2 regressions 
where all VIF/Tolerences are within thresholds. However, in none of the regressions 
(Tables 50-53) is CEO tenure significantly related to strategic conformity or strategic 
dynamism. Because there is no significant relationship between those variables, there is 







VIFs/Tolerances for Hypothesis 6 a-b & 7 a-b Regression 
 Conformity 1 Conformity 2 Dynamism 1 Dynamism 2 
Variables VIF Tol VIF Tol VIF Tol VIF Tol 
Firm Size 4.502 0.222 2.067 0.484 4.718 0.212 2.065 0.484
Firm Age 2.723 0.367 1.496 0.668 2.520 0.397 1.452 0.689
CEO Age 2.638 0.379 2.007 0.498 2.772 0.361 1.974 0.507
Industry 1.416 0.706 1.297 0.771 1.527 0.655
CEO Tenure 33.779 0.030 18.538 0.054 41.460 0.024 18.490 0.054
Tenure x Task Challenges 1 2.839 0.352 1.661 0.602 2.970 0.337 1.658 0.603
Tenure x Task Challenges 2 1.882 0.531 1.805 0.554 2.510 0.398 1.748 0.572
Tenure x Task Challenges 3 3.158 0.317 1.357 0.737 3.135 0.319 1.357 0.737
Tenure x Task Challenges 4 2.194 0.456 1.431 0.699 2.197 0.455 1.305 0.766
Tenure x Performance Challenges 1 1.467 0.682 1.125 0.889 1.483 0.674 1.119 0.894
Tenure x Performance Challenges 2 1.847 0.541 1.504 0.665 2.152 0.465 1.435 0.697
Tenure x CEO Education Level 4.435 0.225 2.643 0.378 4.208 0.238 2.635 0.380
Tenure x Age Became CEO 24.131 0.041 15.669 0.064 27.692 0.036 15.658 0.064











Hypothesis 6a & 7a: CEO Tenure and Strategic Conformity                                          
Moderation Regression Results (Conformity 1 Measure)  
  Stage 1   Stage 2   Stage 3   VIF Tol 
Firm Size -0.083  -0.077  0.370  4.453 0.225
Firm Age -0.083  -0.054  0.272  2.704 0.370
CEO Age -0.250 * -0.229 + -0.412 ** 1.537 0.650
Industry 0.550 ** 0.560 *** 0.521 *** 1.404 0.712
CEO Tenure   -0.094  -0.206  8.796 0.114
Tenure x Task Challenges 1     -0.388 * 2.781 0.360
Tenure x Task Challenges 2     0.263 + 1.870 0.535
Tenure x Task Challenges 3     -0.434 * 3.145 0.318
Tenure x Task Challenges 4     0.186  2.194 0.456
Tenure x Performance Challenges 1     -0.050  1.457 0.686
Tenure x Performance Challenges 2     0.025  1.569 0.637
Tenure x CEO Education Level     0.317  4.301 0.232
Tenure x CEO Incentive Pay     -0.008  4.411 0.227
         
Change in R2 0.334  0.007  0.146    
F  value  6.78 *** 0.54  1.61    
Total R2 0.334   0.341   0.487       
N=54         
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.001 level (two-tailed).       
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed).        
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed).        







Hypothesis 6a & 7a: CEO Tenure and Strategic Conformity                                          
Moderation Regression Results (Conformity 2 Measure)  
Variables Stage 1   Stage 2   Stage 3   VIF Tol 
Firm Size -0.025  -0.027  0.048  2.053 0.487
Firm Age -0.005  -0.006  -0.050  1.494 0.670
CEO Age -0.109  -0.111  -0.120  1.451 0.689
Industry 0.312 *** 0.312 *** 0.302 *** 1.296 0.772
CEO Tenure   0.007  0.047  4.817 0.208
Tenure x Task Challenges 1     0.008  1.649 0.606
Tenure x Task Challenges 2     0.026  1.801 0.555
Tenure x Task Challenges 3     -0.004  1.329 0.752
Tenure x Task Challenges 4     0.118  1.406 0.711
Tenure x Performance Challenges 1     0.173 * 1.114 0.897
Tenure x Performance Challenges 2     0.018  1.279 0.782
Tenure x CEO Education Level     0.063  2.641 0.379
Tenure x CEO Incentive Pay     -0.055  2.887 0.346
         
Change in R2 0.123  0.000  0.046    
F  value  6.84 *** 0.01  1.29    
Total R2 0.123   0.123   0.169       
N=200         
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.001 level (two-tailed).       
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed).        
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed).        







Hypothesis 6b & 7b: CEO Tenure and Strategic Dynamism                                           
Moderation Regression Results (Dynamism 1 Measure)  
Variables Stage 1   Stage 2   Stage 3   VIF Tol 
Firm Size -0.296 + -0.290 + -0.467 + 4.717 0.212
Firm Age -0.137  -0.094  -0.232  2.520 0.397
CEO Age -0.112  -0.083  -0.025  1.518 0.659
Industry -0.273 * -0.276 * -0.265  1.394 0.717
CEO Tenure   -0.124  -0.550 + 10.108 0.099
Tenure x Task Challenges 1    0.279  2.879 0.347
Tenure x Task Challenges 2    0.090  2.496 0.401
Tenure x Task Challenges 3    0.352  3.097 0.323
Tenure x Task Challenges 4    0.017  2.197 0.455
Tenure x Performance Challenges 1    0.079  1.472 0.680
Tenure x Performance Challenges 2    -0.117  1.727 0.579
Tenure x CEO Education Level    0.311  3.978 0.251
Tenure x CEO Incentive Pay    0.235  5.215 0.192
         
Change in R2 0.297  0.012  0.094    
F  value  5.18 *** 0.84  0.79    
Total R2 0.297   0.309   0.403       
N=54         
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.001 level (two-tailed).       
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed).        
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed).        








Hypothesis 6b & 7b: CEO Tenure and Strategic Dynamism                                           
Moderation Regression Results (Dynamism 2 Measure)  
Variables Stage 1   Stage 2   Stage 3   VIF Tol 
Firm Size -0.180 * -0.172 * -0.173 + 2.050 0.488
Firm Age 0.113  0.121  0.069  1.450 0.690
CEO Age -0.196 ** -0.181 * -0.138 + 1.410 0.709
CEO Tenure   -0.048  -0.018  4.803 0.208
Tenure x Task Challenges 1    0.102  1.645 0.608
Tenure x Task Challenges 2    0.130  1.745 0.573
Tenure x Task Challenges 3    0.075  1.329 0.753
Tenure x Task Challenges 4    0.073  1.283 0.779
Tenure x Performance Challenges 1    0.112  1.108 0.902
Tenure x Performance Challenges 2    -0.030  1.204 0.831
Tenure x CEO Education Level    0.021  2.633 0.380
Tenure x CEO Incentive Pay    0.021  2.887 0.346
         
Change in R2 0.064  0.002  0.044    
F  value  4.48 ** 0.39  1.16    
Total R2 0.064   0.066   0.110       
N=200         
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.001 level (two-tailed).       
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed).        
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed).        




Because of the weaknesses in my results, I decided to perform a further test of 
hypotheses 1, 2, 3 and 5a-b in an SEM model using SAS 9.2. This analysis used the 
Proc Calis command specifying a maximum likelihood estimation. Due to issues with 
negative eigenvalues, this analysis used the ridge option in Proc Calis to ridge the 
diagonal of the covariance matrix in order to obtain a matrix that was positive definite 
and therefore capable of testing. However, this technique prevents interpretability of 
standardized results and therefore unstandardized estimates are reported in my results. I 
analyzed both measurement and structural model simultaneously based upon Loehlin’s 
(2004) observation that such approach is the typical process because “ in so doing, one 
brings to bear all information available about each path” (89). I initially ran the model 
with: task challenges being measured by the quick ratio, current ratio, diversification, 
productivity, presence of COO/President, CEO duality, TMT heterogeneity, TMT firm 
tenure, and TMT team tenure; performance challenges measured by outside directors, 
outside directors appointed before the CEO, board stock ownership and institutional 
ownership; executive aspirations measured by CEO education level, age of CEO when 
they became CEO, CEO entrepreneurial activity and CEO bonus achievement; and 
financial performance being measured by ROA, ROE, ROS and Tobin’s Q. In this 
initial analysis, no fit statistic suggested a good fitting model. In an attempt to improve 
fit, I first removed the latent variable executive aspirations and its associated manifest 
indicators from the model because my original factor analysis had suggested that those 
variables did not sufficiently factor together. I had included it in this analysis to see if 
the more sophisticated technique of SEM might find some relationship that my previous 




confirming that my measures of executive aspirations did not effectively measure the 
construct. While this model was a better fitting one, the fit statistics still did not indicate 
a good fitting model.  
I continued respecifying the model in the hopes of finding a better fitting model. 
This respecification was undertaken with Anderson and Gerbing’s (1988) advice that 
respecification must be driven by theory or content of the variable in mind. 
Theoretically, I reconsidered the appropriateness of the CEO duality measure. I 
conceptualized this measure as increasing demands because it added to the overall tasks 
that the CEO was responsible for performing. However, being chairperson of the board 
would also tend to increase the influence of the CEO over the board, increasing the 
latitude of action of the CEO and decreasing the demands placed on the CEO by the 
board (Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987). Removing the  CEO duality measure did 
improve the fit of the model.  
From a content perspective, I focused on the  measures of slack, TMT team and 
firm tenure, outside directors and outside directors appointed after the CEO took his or 
her job and Tobin’s Q. Compared to the other measures of financial performance, 
Tobin’s Q focuses much more on the market performance of the firm and is remarkably 
different from the accounting based measures of ROA, ROE and ROS. Therefore I 
removed Tobin’s Q from the model. Examining the pairs of variables, (current and 
quick ratio; TMT team and firm tenure; outside directors and outside directors 
appointed after the CEO took his or her job), each pair is conceptually and 
methodologly similar. The quick ratio is the current ratio with a correction for 




TMT member who has been in the firm for a long time is likely also a long tenured 
member of the TMT. Conversely, many of the TMT members with a short tenure joined 
the firm as a member of the TMT, thus their team and firm tenure are the exact same. 
The measure of outside directors appointed after the CEO took his or her job and the 
outside directors measure are, like the slack measures, the same base measure with one 
being modified. I included all of these measures in an attempt to thoroughly measure 
the constructs. However, given the poor fit of my model, it seemed likely that their 
similarity was negatively affecting my results. I evaluated the competing models by 
including one variable of the pairs and evaluating the standard fit statistics of RMSEA, 
NNFI, NFI and Chi-Squared. Through this evaluation, the inclusion of the quick ratio, 
TMT team tenure and outside directors led to the best fitting model, and therefore only 
those variables were retained for the analysis. 
 The results of my analysis can be seen in figure 4. As can be seen, there is some 
support for hypotheses 1 and  2. There is also support for a modified hypothesis 311, 
such that demands would be seen to decrease financial performance. The fit statistics 
do, in general, suggest a well fitting model. The RMSEA statistic is less than 0.05, the 
prescribed value for a good fitting model. Further, the NNFI is above the suggested 
value of 0.90, also suggesting a good fitting model. The NFI statistic is below the 
                                                 
11 While there were compelling arguments for a direct inverse-U shaped relationship between demands 
and performance, the stress literature might make an opposing hypothesis. There is the reality that tasks 
with a large number of stressors/demands are objectively more difficult. Objectively more difficult tasks 
do tend to have less positive results (Ganster, 2005) and so even if the demands themselves have a 
positive outcome on the efforts of the top managers, the outcomes are likely to be less positive than those 
of easier tasks. Given the impact top managers have on strategy and therefore subsequent firm 
performance, it may be that these demands-performance relationships will hold at the firm level because 































Manifest Variables and Factor Loadings
1 Quick Ratio 0.034 7 Outside Directors 0.029
2 Diversification 0.012 8 Board Ownership -0.011
3 Productivity 0.042 9 Institutional Inv. 0.101
4 COO/President -0.004 10 ROA 2007 1
5 TMT Heterogeneity 0.145 11 ROE 2007 2.808
6 TMT Team Tenure 0.055 12 ROS 2007 1.698
RMSEA – 0.049     NNFI – 0.92     NFI – 0.84     Chi-Squared – 97.04 (df-66)









Effect Decomposition for Performance and Sobel Tests





Task Challenges -0.1874 0.1403 -0.0471 1.9233 1.5527




suggested value of 0.90, however, at 0.84, it is relatively close and with the other 
measures of fit indicating a good fitting model, this does not completely discount the 
likelihood of fit. However, the Chi-squared statistic suggests a very poor fitting model 
given that it is strongly significant ( p< 0.01). While that statistic is concerning from the 
standpoint of good fit, it may be as much a function of sample size as an indicator of 
poor fit. The Chi-squared statistic is very susceptible to being influenced by a large 
sample size (such that this study’s sample of 200 would dramatically increase the 
probability of finding significance). The RMSEA, a measure not dependent on sample 
size, suggesting good fit, provides confidence that this model is a good fitting one 
despite the Chi-squared results. 
The paths from task challenges did show a significant positive relationship with 
strategic conformity and strategic dynamism, providing support for hypotheses 1 and 2. 
Performance challenges did not have a significant relationship to strategic conformity or 
strategic dynamism, weakening support for hypotheses 1 and 2. Hypothesis 3 has 
similar support, in that the path from task challenges to financial performance is 
significant and negative. However, performance challenges did not significantly impact 
financial performance, again weakening support for the hypothesis that job demands 
affect financial performance. 
To test hypothesis 4, the mediation hypothesis, I took  MacKinnon, Lockwood, 
Hoffman, West and Sheets (2002) suggestion to test the mediated paths simultaneously 




The test is as follows: 
ab/ Sqrt (b2sa2 + a2sb2 + sa2sb2  ) 
where: 
 a=Path from mediated variable to mediator 
 sa =Standard error of path a 
 b= Path from mediator variable to dependent variable 
 sb=Standard error of path  
 
The results of this test are found in figure 4. As none of the tests were above 
±1.96, there is no support for a mediated relationship and therefore hypotheses 5a and 
5b are disconfirmed.  
The results reported in this chapter found some support for hypotheses 1, 2 and 
4. Hypothesis 5a and b were disconfirmed, however, there is some support for 
dynamism having a partial mediation relationship between demands and performance. 
5. Hypotheses 3, 6 and 7 were disconfirmed. My follow-up SEM analysis increased my 
confidence in the relationships of hypotheses 1 and 2, found support for a modified 
hypothesis 3, but still found no support for hypotheses 5a and 5b. In Chapter 5, I will 







 This dissertation has examined empirically executive job demands and their 
impact on decision processes and firm performance. Previous research on job demands 
and stressors was primarily concerned with the lower levels of the organization. While 
these studies gave particular insight into the functioning of the organization and the 
people that worked within it, moving the focus of attention onto top level executives 
seems an important and interesting area of research because of the impact on firm level 
outcomes from the decisions and behaviors of top executives (Carpenter et al., 2004).  
Hambrick et al., (2005a) set out an, until now, untested theoretical argument as to how 
job demands would affect strategic decisions and performance outcomes. This 
dissertation has tested those arguments as well as arguing that demands can affect 
performance variability. I have begun the work of operationalizing a meaningfully 
testable measure of the demands placed on a top executive. Further, I have shown 
appreciation for the assumed but rarely tested notion that the antecedents of decision 
making have an effect on performance mediated by the decisions made. 
 My results suggest that job demands have at least some effect on the conformity 
and dynamism of a firm’s strategy as well as on the variability of their performance. 
While the evidence is not overwhelming, given that a minority of task or performance 
challenge factors were significant in each regression analysis and the latent variable 
performance was not significant in the SEM analysis, there is at least some indication 
that demands encourage managers to behave mimetically, lead to changes in strategy, 




support for the notion that demands constricts the lens through which managers 
perceive information. In a situation where a manager must reduce the number of 
multiple fallible indicators perceived and processed, they may be more likely to fall 
back on the best practices of the industry rather than doing a fuller search of possible 
alternatives and selecting the best one. Further, managers under stress may not be able 
to search for a number of possible alternatives or discussing those alternatives with 
others. By failing to obtain a “diversification of opinion” their alternatives will be more 
prone to the possibility of error, leading to more varying performance (Sah & Stiglitz, 
1986, 1991). This also provides support for the idea that high demands distort the lens 
through which fallible indicators are perceived, leading to indicators being seen as a 
threat. This perspective would then lead to either the threat rigidity response or more 
risk seeking behavior and a vacillation between the two (Hambrick & D’Aveni, 1988) 
leading to increased dynamism in strategy. 
 The lack of findings for my moderation hypotheses (H6a-b & H7a-b) affect the 
argument that demands affect the lens. If demands are responsible for constricting the 
lens, then higher job demands should increase the degree to which prior experience 
encourages a manager to reduce their search and fall back on their habitual behavior. If 
demands are responsible for distorting the lens, then high job demands should reduce 
the managerial preferences of a long tenured manager to stay the course and not engage 
in domain changing, dynamic strategies. However, why these hypotheses were rejected 
may suggest some explanation other than that demands do not affect the lens. Some of 
the interaction effects between my measures of job demands and tenure are still 




relationship between tenure and conformity or dynamism. Given previous research 
suggesting a relationship between TMT tenure and conformity or dynamism 
(Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1990), this result is fairly surprising. It is possible that given 
increasing uncertainty and speed of business change, highly tenured managers no longer 
have the luxury of avoiding dynamic strategies and instead focusing on their prior, 
industry standard, strategies. However, this may also be related to the data itself. As 
discussed, the data collected severely limited my ability to test the full conformity and 
dynamism measures (Conformity 1 and Dynamism 1) due to missing data. This led to 
low power tests of the full measures as well as an incomplete test of the overall 
construct in the Conformity and Dynamism 2 measures. Finkelstein and Hambrick 
(1990) had similar data limitations and also tested these measures separately. Their 
results were similar for both measurements, but the differences I found in my own 
results suggest that is not the case in my study. It is possible that with a more complete 
test of the full measures, the hypotheses will come out significant, offering confirmation 
of theory. Further discussion of this limitation is below. 
 The lack of confirmation of there being an inverse-U shaped relationship 
between demands and performance also merits discussion. There is something of a 
debate as to the legitimacy of the inverse-U shaped relationship (Ganster, 2005; 
Hambrick et al., 2005b). Ganster (2005) challenged that “research has not so far 
convincingly shown that there is a downturn in the monotonic positive relationship 
between arousal and performance” (497) and cited a review of the literature as support 
(Ganster & Schaubroeck, 1991). While Hambrick et al., (2005a) consider this idea to be 




in attempts to find support for this relationship (Hambrick et al., 2005b). It appears as 
though this study supports Ganster’s argument. It may also be that the relationship is 
obscured by the contrasting effects of stressors/activation and task difficulty. Challenge 
stressors/demands (LePine et al., 2005) and increased activation brought on by demands 
(Gardner, 1986; Gardner & Cummings, 1988) were suggested to increase performance. 
However, tasks that are more demanding and have larger numbers of stressors are more 
difficult and difficult tasks have less positive results (Ganster, 2005). This effect was 
likely seen in my SEM analysis, which did find a negative relationship between task 
challenges and financial performance. 
 The regression results may suggest a multidimensional approach to demands. 
This dissertation treated all aspects of demands as having similar effects on the 
dependent variables. When evaluating Hypothesis 3, while a number of task challenges 
were found to impact performance negatively (as would be expected without an 
activation theory effect), performance challenges were seen to positively impact 
performance. Evaluating this difference requires consideration of the differences in task 
and performance challenges. Task challenges are constraints placed on the top manager 
based upon characteristics of the organization and external environment. If the manager 
is heavily constrained, it would stand to reason that performance would be likely to 
diminish. However, performance challenges are conceptually a demand for a set level of 
performance from the owners. It equally stands to reason that if performance demands 
are high, managers will be striving more to increase performance, thus the positive 
relationship. This explanation may also be applicable to the negative results of 




differing relationships with conformity and dynamism. There are relationships 
suggesting that task challenges and performance challenges increase conformity while 
only task challenges increase dynamism. Given that one of the attractive reasons to 
behave mimetically is because of the strategy’s easy defensibility to shareholders, CEOs 
under high performance challenges may feel the need to defend their strategic choices 
all the more acutely. Conversely performance challenges might discourage dynamic 
behavior. Managers would take safer and less erratic strategic paths if high demands for 
performance are included. While the SEM analysis did not directly show differences in 
effects of task challenges and performance challenges, performance challenges did not 
have a significant effect on dynamism, conformity or financial performance. This may, 
in and of itself, be an indicator of multidimensionality. Further, while the path from 
performance challenges to dynamism was not significant, it was in a different direction 
from those of task challenges. It is possible that in further research a multidimensional 
effect on strategic processes and firm performance will be found. 
Based upon my SEM analysis, there does not appear to be any mediating 
relationship of conformity or dynamism between the relationship of demands and 
performance. However, this may not be surprising. The organization that originates a 
given strategic act does so in an attempt to improve their performance. As more firms 
adopt that behavior, the performance improvement diminishes and following that 
behavior is used to show the firm as legitimate rather than to increase the financial 
performance of the firm (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Because 
firms engaging a conformity strategy are gaining legitimacy rather than increasing 




average returns for the industry. Therefore, as demands increase and managers look 
more towards copying the strategic behavior of exemplar firms than performing 
adequate scanning and interpretation to develop their own strategic direction, a firm 
with a CEO under high job demands might be expected to perform at a level near the 
average of the industry. Therefore, no real increase in performance would be 
recognized. With regards to dynamism, if demands are causing fallible indicators to be 
seen as threats and those threats are leading managers to engage in risk seeking 
behaviors it may be that the threatening indicators are actually indicative of an 
objectively harder task. Such a task, as suggested above, tends to have less positive 
results. If that is the case, the effect of the difficult task is overwhelming any impact of 
dramatically changing strategy.  However, as I have already suggested, these results 
may be an artifact of data constraints rather than an actual picture of reality. 
 This dissertation has also provided a first step in recontextualizing upper 
echelons theorizing. Prior research has looked primarily at upper echelons as more of a 
process model: information comes in, is filtered by cognitive bases and values and lead 
to a firm’s strategic outcome. The theoretical base of the lens model offers a step 
forward in explaining the effects of those bases and values on the decision maker. It 
interjects a “why” (Bacharach, 1989) into the discussion of upper echelons behavior. By 
looking at this idea through a demands perspective, I have had a focus on the tightening 
and distorting of a managers perceptual lens. However, upper echelons research  has 
studied elements like international experience (Carpenter & Fredrickson, 2001; 
Carpenter, Sanders & Gregersen, 2001), extra-industry ties (Geletkanycz & Hambrick, 




easily broaden the lens, allowing more fallible indicators to be perceived and processed. 
The lens model theoretical perspective should be more broadly applied to upper 
echelons research and should be used to further explicate the decision making processes 
underlying the cognitive bases and values and the subsequent outcomes. 
Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
Methodologically, there are four changes to be made in future studies. First, this 
study attempted to examine demands’ effect on an executive: how did conditions in 
2005 affect the strategic and performance outcomes of the firm? While there was some 
support found in this study, expanding the sample to a longitudinal study should provide 
added explanatory power to my hypothetical arguments. Providing evidence of an effect 
stable over time provides added generalizability and better evidence of an effect (or lack 
of one thereof). By examining over a longer period of time, some interesting other 
questions might be considered. First, if a longitudinal sample covered multiple CEOs 
from the same firm with relatively stable demands, I may find support towards 
considering the person vs. situation approach to demands. Further, it may consider 
differences in demands themselves, namely, are demands higher overall now than they 
were in prior years? Does a demanding job in one year become less demanding in future 
years, and, if so, does an executive’s response change? 
 Second, while my sample was selected expecting to show the effects of job 
demands on some of the largest firms in the country across many industries, there were 
data limitations created by this sample that limited my ability to test theory. The data 
limitations of certain industries (lack of reporting advertising and R&D expenses; 




sample of fewer 2-digit NAICS industries, I will be able to gather uniform data from the 
Economic Census on elements of environmental complexity that, while untested here, 
are very likely contributors to the demands placed on managers (Hambrick et al., 
2005a). I will also be able to focus in on industry with normative pressures on reporting 
of advertising and R&D as opposed to having data from industries with normative 
pressures against. This change will likely strengthen and improve my analysis of 
conformity and dynamism since the full measure suffered from severe power issues and 
the incomplete measure, while having prior use in the literature (Finkelstein & 
Hambrick, 1990), lacks the richness of the full measure. Further, by focusing on one or 
a few specific 2-digit NAICS industries, I may introduce more variation into my 
variables. By putting a focus on the S&P 500, I selected from some of the largest (and 
relatively stable) firms in the country. Perhaps by moving beyond these firms, I will see 
firms under much stronger demands and find more compelling results. 
 The failure of the executive aspirations variables to either factor together or to 
meaningfully predict the firm outcomes provides another strong limitation. Moving 
forward, different operationalizations must be used in order to capture this concept. My 
attempt to find reasonable proxies to map onto the Manifest Need Questionnaire’s 
achievement scale did not work, however, the issues with obtaining sufficient survey 
data from CEOs is still problematic. The next step should be attempting to use content 
analysis of CEO interviews or shareholder letters as a means of capturing this data. 
Content analysis has been successfully used to identify managerial cognitions and is, in 
general seen as useful for identifying the perceptions and beliefs of managers (e.g. 




Palmer, 2003). Again, it will make sense to begin with the validated scales of 
achievement and using the concepts tested and gathered in those scales to develop word 
lists or other rubrics by which to analyze CEO communication with the outside 
community. Future focused communications may also be of interest, since a greater 
focus on the status quo in communications with the investor and stakeholder community 
may signal lower ambitions and aspirations, while a more dynamic and revolutionary 
future focus may convey a greater striving on the part of the top executive. 
 Finally, while the performance challenges measures seemed to provide some 
insight into the effects of demands, there may be ways of increasing that insight. The 
current measures focus on monitoring. While strong monitoring would tend to express 
high demands for a set level of performance and would encourage managers to achieve 
such levels of performance, this measure is missing operationalization of that actual 
level of performance demanded. It may be fruitful to include a measure of what level of 
performance owners are demanding. A modest increase year over year would certainly 
be less demanding than a large one. Perhaps inclusion of items such as earnings 
guidance releases from the firm or analyst reports on the firm’s earnings may enrich this 
measure. 
 Outside of the methodological limitations that should be corrected moving 
forward, this construct may have a number of possible firm and individual outcomes 
that can be considered. Perhaps one of the more interesting is that of executive turnover, 
an increasing effect of the job becoming more difficult (Hsu, 2009; Kaplan & Minton, 
2006). A highly demanding job can create emotional exhaustion and subsequent 




thinking more of leaving the organization (and ultimately doing so) (Drake & Yadama, 
1996; Geurts et. al, 1998; Koeske & Koeske, 1993). It is expected that the same 
outcomes for burnout at lower levels of the organization would hold for the CEO. The 
costs of turnover (recruiting and screening, training and disruption to existing customer 
relationships) can be significant at any level (Cascio, 1991; Davis, Schoorman, Mayer 
& Tan, 2000). However, at the level of the top executive, in addition to these costs, 
there is also the disruption to strategy (Wiersema, 1992), a break in organizational 
momentum (Miller, 1993) and disruption of stakeholder relationships (Kenser & 
Sebora, 1994). The challenge with this work would be establishing when a CEO leaves 
his or her job due to burnout as opposed to being dismissed. Oftentimes CEOs will 
“resign” regardless of what the true dynamics may be and the actual reasons for 
dismissal are not fully disclosed (Denis & Denis, 1995; Fredrickson, Hambrick, & 
Baumrin, 1988; Shen & Cannella, 2002; Weisbach, 1988). This confound could be 
exacerbated in a situation of high job demands. Because mangers facing high demands 
may be facing increased pressure from owners for a given level of performance, failure 
to meet that level of performance may increase the likelihood of dismissal. 
Implications for Managers 
 From a managerial standpoint, this may well provide evidence that suboptimal 
outcomes are a consequence of dealing with high demands. There is at least some 
support to suggest that when demands are high, top managers take information 
processing short-cuts that may or may not be appropriate given the business 
circumstances. There is also some evidence suggesting that dynamic strategies increase 




overall performance. This supports years of previous research suggesting that there is 
too much information to be processed for a perfectly rational decision, and thus 
managers satisfice in their decisions (Cyert & March, 1963; March & Simon, 1958; 
Simon, 1947). William Ford Jr.’s solution may be the most appropriate: reducing the 
duties on any given individual. Within this study a majority of managers did not have a 
named COO or President (115) nor was there a separate chairperson (136). While the 
value of investing the responsibilities of the office of the president into three different 
individuals is up for debate (Finkelstein & D’Aveni, 1994; Hambrick & Cannella, 
2004),  it makes some intuitive sense that division of labor would reduce the overall 
demands on any one individual. Any reduction in demands on one individual would 
hopefully expand the lens of the overall office of the president and allow more optimal 
decisions to be made on the part of the CEO and his or her management team. 
Conclusion 
 While this dissertation does not strongly support the argument that a CEO’s job 
is too difficult leading to negative outcomes for strategic and financial performance 
outcomes, it is a first step in empirically studying this question. Methodological 
refinements may well provide a stronger story in favor of the theory. However, there is 
at least some indication that changes to strategic and performance outcomes can be 
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